Besides the above arguments, I wish to furnish the latest example of the difficulty which was experienced here is the previous year of 617, as there were so many who had to decide the allotment of offices. This was when Don Joan Ronquillo, with that great fleet, went out and fought the one that the enemy maintained along these coasts. As each one of them [i.e., the auditors and fiscal] sought the best galleon and the most prominent post for his relative or favorite, the galleons were divided among these, ignoring persons who could manage them better than some of those who were chosen. No admiral was appointed for the fleet, from which resulted no advantage, but rather injury—and there might have been more if the commander of the fleet had died, as might have happened, and each one would have sought to take his place, as this was not specified. This [same defect] was found in the ordinances which the Audiencia of Mexico issued, with so many opinions, when the government was in its charge, that your Majesty ordered them to be repealed and amended, as they were so insufficient for such emergencies; and because it was so evident and certain (as it likewise is to my knowledge) that through the power which appoints those who serve, and punishes them when they are in the wrong, they ought to be rewarded when they are right. For otherwise the governor and captain-general would be the man who persuades or compels them to serve and labor, and it would be the auditors who must reward them; for it is in their power to say who are competent and who not, without its remaining in the power of the governor to do more than make a proposition in their favor—which would be of no force if two auditors joined against his opinion, as they almost always do. Such persons, therefore, would very seldom succeed in obtaining the reward of their services; and this office of governor and captain-general would become the most down-trodden, wearisome, and undignified of all that your Majesty has in his pay and service—and it should be well considered that the office today is one of the most laborious and least profitable, when it is served as it should be, considering its importance. Your Majesty will make suitable provision, adding to these observations the fact that the prestige of Espana has been greatly endangered by the lack of troops and money in parts so distant from aid, and in a country which has so many enemies—the worst in this respect being those who are nearest, and who are able to make the most cruel thrusts at our honor, directed and guided by the auditors, without their heeding truth or conscience, and of which I have already often complained to your Majesty. If the said auditors are to be given still greater authority, whether it be for conferring benefits or taking them away, your Majesty will see how they will treat his president and those who are helping him. Moreover, if authority be taken away from him, in place of being given to him for his greater honor