to embark hurriedly, leaving on the field and taking away many dead and badly wounded, while we suffered in dead and wounded twenty or a few more.  Thereupon the enemy weighed anchor and left the port in great ignominy and sorrow.  That feat of arms was of great importance as can be understood from the condition of the country and of the natives of that island and others near by.  I cannot keep silent on one thing that happened through the fault of him who was governing, since my intention is to make your Majesty understand the state of that kingdom.  The building of a fort in that port of Yloylo, and the sending there of six pieces of artillery and one engineer to Don Diego, had been discussed in Manila.  But there was the utmost remissness and neglect in sending those pieces, for it was considered certain that if the enemy came he would manage to make himself master of the port.  And although they could have been sent him one month before, they reached him one week after the opportunity was gone—­when, if Don Diego had had them, he would have sunk half the enemy’s fleet.  Such injury is done by the remissness and neglect of him who governs.

The enemy thought that they would make little from Don Diego, and consequently left that place, and went to anchor in the mouth of the bay of Manila.  They reached an island which is situated in the middle of the entrance, called Marivelez, where a sentinel is always posted to give notice of the ships that come to the city.  He made signals, and hence, as we had advices, their arrival was known.  They anchored their vessels at both entrances, so that no ship could enter or leave without being seen.  They captured a few provision-boats, and on some days they entered the bay with two or three ships to reconnoiter the port of Cabite, with the desire of having an extended view, and then returned.  They had some communication with the Japanese, who, as arrogant and barbarous people, despised our fleet.  Those people informed the Dutch that they had nothing to fear, for we were unable to prepare our fleet because of the lack of many things, so that they could be quite easy.  Consequently they proceeded as would those who feared nothing.

Licentiate Andres de Alcaraz was then senior auditor, and was exercising the duties of captain-general.  At several councils of war, it was discussed whether it would be proper to prepare the fleet that was in port, in order to drive the enemy away.  Most were of the opinion that the fleet should go out, founding their opinion on the ignominy and taunts that the enemy flung upon the Spaniards, the reputation that we would lose among so many nations who were watching us, the need of provisions that the enemy were making them endure, and the design of the latter to await the ships from China in order to enrich themselves from the merchandise that the Chinese were bringing to Manila.  Those vessels were to come by April, and, besides the general danger of depriving the community