“That immoral tendency of doctrines, which has been urged as a reason against allowing the public discussion of them, may be either avowed and direct? or only a consequence with which they are charged.  If it is avowed and direct, such doctrines certainly will not spread; the principles rooted, in human nature will resist them, and the advocates of them will be soon disgraced.  If, on the contrary, it is only a consequence with which a doctrine is charged, it should be considered how apt all parties are to charge the doctrines they oppose with bad tendencies.  It is well known that Calvinists and Arminians, Trinitarians and Socinians, Fatalists and Free-Willers, are continually exclaiming against one another’s opinions, as dangerous and licentious.  Even Christianity itself could not, at its first introduction, escape this accusation.  The professors of it were considered as atheists, because they opposed pagan idolatry; and their religion was, on this account, reckoned a destructive and pernicious enthusiasm.  If, therefore, the rulers of a state are to prohibit the propagation of all doctrines, in which they apprehend immoral tendencies, an opening will be made, as I have before observed, for every species of persecution.  There will be no doctrine, however true or important, the avowal of which will not, in, some country or other, be subjected to civil penalties.”

These observations bear the stamp of good sense, and their truth has been abundantly confirmed by experience; and it is the peculiar honour of the United States, that in conformity with the principles of these observations, perfect freedom, of opinion and of speech, are here established by law, and are the birthright of every citizen thereof.  Our country* is the only one which has not been guilty of the folly of establishing the ascendancy of one set of religious opinions, and persecuting or tolerating all others, and which does not permit any man to harass his neighbour, because he thinks differently from himself.  In consequence of these excellent institutions, difference of religious sentiment; makes here no breach in private friendship, and works no danger to the public security.  This is as it should be; for, in matters of opinion, especially with regard to so important a thing as religion, it is every man’s natural right and duty to think for himself, and to judge upon such evidence as he can procure, after he has used his best endeavours to get information.  Human decisions are of no weight in this matter, for another man has no more right to. determine what his opinions shall be, than I have to determine what another man’s opinions shall be.  It is amazing that one man can dare to presume he has such a right over another; and that any man can be so weak and credulous, as to imagine, that another has such right over him.

As it is every man’s natural right and duty to think and judge for himself in matters of opinion; so he should be allowed freely to bring forward and defend his opinions, and to endeavour, when be judges proper, to convince others also of their truth.