over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus that connects North and South America as will protect our national interests.”  This policy, which had received the direct approval of Congress, was vigorously upheld by Secretary Blaine.  The Colombian Republic had proposed to the European powers to join in a guaranty of the neutrality of the proposed Panama Canal.  One of President Garfield’s first acts under the advice of Secretary Blaine was to remind the European governments of the exclusive rights which the United States had secured with the country to be traversed by the interoceanic waterway.  These exclusive rights rendered the prior guaranty of the United States government indispensable, and the powers were informed that any foreign guaranty would be not only an unnecessary but unfriendly act.  As the United States had made, in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, a special agreement with Great Britain on this subject, Secretary Blaine supplemented his memorandum to the powers by a formal proposal for the abrogation of all provisions of that convention which were not in accord with the guaranties and privileges covenanted for in the compact with the Colombian Republic.  In this state paper, the most elaborate of the series receiving his signature as secretary of state, Mr. Blaine contended that the operation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty practically conceded to Great Britain the control of any canal which might be constructed in the isthmus, as that power was required, by its insular position and colonial possessions, to maintain a naval establishment with which the United States could not compete.  As the American government had bound itself by its engagements in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty not to fight in the isthmus, nor to fortify the mouths of any waterway that might be constructed, the secretary argued that if any struggle for the control of the canal were to arise England would have an advantage at the outset which would prove decisive.  “The treaty,” he remarked, “commands this government not to use a single regiment of troops to protect its interests in connection with the interoceanic canal, but to surrender the transit to the guardianship and control of the British navy.”  The logic of this paper was unanswerable from an American point of view.

The war between Chili and Peru had virtually ended with the capture of Lima on January 17, 1881.  The state department made strenuous exertions to bring about the conclusion of an early peace between Chili and the two prostrate states which had been crushed in war.  The influence of the government was brought to bear upon victorious Chili in the interest of peace and magnanimity; but, owing to an unfortunate misapprehension of Mr. Blaine’s instructions, the United States ministers did not promote the ends of peace.  Special envoys were accordingly sent to South America, accredited to the three governments, with general instructions which should enable them to bring those belligerent