The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776 will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance.  As early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enlisted “for the war.”  In a previous article, the policy of the Commander-in-chief and of General Greene was noticed, and the formulated proposition, then accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle.  When the issue ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man who understood the exact issue.  The temper of the British press, and that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the American Commander-in-chief.  He knew that General Gage had urged that “thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest way to save blood and end the war.”  He also knew that when John Wesley predicted that “neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would suppress the rebellion,” the British Cabinet had placed before Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed available for military purposes abroad.  As early as May, 1776, Washington was advised of the following facts:—­

First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States, including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.

Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall below, forty thousand men.

The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed operations were so closely defined and analyzed, that Washington had full right to assume, as known, the strength of his adversary.

When, during May, 1776, the American Congress sent troops from New York to Canada, he sharply protested, thus:  “This diversion of forces will endanger both enterprises; for Great Britain will attempt to capture New York as well as Canada, if they have the men.”  He did not believe that they would capture New York, if he could acquire and retain the force which he demanded.

The point to be made emphatic, is this:  That, from the date of the call of Massachusetts, early in 1775, for thirty thousand men, up to the occupation of New York, the force which he had the right to assume as at his own disposal was equal to the contingencies of the conflict; and that, when he did occupy New York, and begin its exterior defences at Brooklyn, the British ministry had admitted its inability to send to America a force sufficiently strong to capture the city.  The maximum force proposed was less than that which Congress could easily supply for resistance.  In other words, Washington would not have to fight Great Britain, but a specific force; namely, all that Great Britain could spare for that service; so that the issue was not between the new Republic and England, but between the Republic and a single army, of known elements and numbers.  In fact, the opinion that France had already made war upon England had so early gained credit, that Washington, while still in New York, was forced to issue an order correcting the rumor, and thus prevent undue confidence and its corresponding neglect to meet the demands of the crisis.