To free the question from a popular fallacy which treats oldtime operations as insignificant, in view of large modern armies and campaigns, it is pertinent to state, just here, that the issues of the battle-field for all time, up to the latest hour, have not been determined by the size of armies, or by improvements in weapons of war, except relatively, in proportion as civilized peoples fought those of less civilization; or where some precocity of race or invention more quickly matured the operations of the winning side.

If the maxims of Napoleon are but a terse restatement of those of Caesar, and the skill of Hannibal at Cannae still holds place as a model for the concave formation of a battle-line, so have all the decisive battles of history taken shape from the timely handling of men, in the exercise of that sound judgment which adapts means to ends, in every work of life.  Thus it is that equally great battles, those in the highest sense great, have become memorial, although numbers did not impart value to the struggle; but they were the expression of that skill and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had been greater or less.

If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in 1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower, make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of Napoleon at Waterloo.

If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect “parallels,” and thereby save a “regular approach.”  Numbers did not change relations, but simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.

He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great.  Washington did it.  His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of his operations at and near New York will defy criticism.  To hold the facts of the issue discussed, right under the light on that military science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in 1776.