The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 13, No. 78, April, 1864 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 310 pages of information about The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 13, No. 78, April, 1864.

The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 13, No. 78, April, 1864 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 310 pages of information about The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 13, No. 78, April, 1864.
by old men, but other old men have won victories for her.  Even those of her generals who were so rapidly beaten by young Bonaparte had been good soldiers elsewhere; and when the Archduke Charles, who was two years the junior of Bonaparte, was sent to meet the Frenchman, he had no better luck than had been found by Beaulieu and Wurmser, though his reverses were not on the same extraordinary scale that had marked the fall of his predecessors.  Twelve years later, in 1809, Napoleon again met the Archduke Charles, and defeated him repeatedly; and though the Archduke was victorious at Essling, he, the younger commander, had not sufficient boldness so to improve his success as should have given to Austria the credit of the deliverance of Germany, which was to come from Russia.  Those who dwell so pertinaciously on the failures of old Austrian generals should in justice to age remember that it was a young Austrian general, and a good soldier too, who showed a most extraordinary want of energy in 1809, immediately after the French under Napoleon had met with the greatest reverse which their arms had then experienced since Bonaparte had been spoiled into a despot.  Prince Schwartzenberg, who had nominal command of the Allied Armies in 1813-14, was of the same age as the Archduke Charles, but it would be absurd to call him a great soldier.  He was a brave man, and he had seen considerable service; but as a general he did not rank even as second-rate.  His appointment to command in 1813 was a political proceeding, meant to conciliate Austria; but though it was a useful appointment in some respects, it was injurious to the Allies in the field; and had the Prince’s plan at Leipsic been adhered to, Napoleon would have won decided successes there.  The Czar wished for the command, and his zeal might have enabled him to do something; but the entire absence of military talent from the list of his accomplishments would have greatly endangered the Allies’ cause.  Schwartzenberg’s merit consisted in this, that he had sufficient influence and tact to “keep things straight” in the councils of a jarring confederacy, until others had gained such victories as placed the final defeat of Napoleon beyond all doubt.  His first battle was Dresden, and there Napoleon gave him a drubbing of the severest character; and the loss of that battle would have carried with it the loss of the cause for which it was fought by the Allies, had it not been that at the very same time were fought and won a series of battles, at the Katzbach and elsewhere, which were due to the boldness of Bluecher, who was old enough to be Schwartzenberg’s father, with more than a dozen years to spare.  Bluecher was also the real hero at Leipsie, where he gained brilliant successes; while on that part of the field where Schwartzenberg commanded, the Allies did but little beyond holding their original ground.  Had Bluecher failed, Leipsie would have been a French victory.

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The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 13, No. 78, April, 1864 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.