12.  What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may learn even from this.  For if any man should conceive certain things as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to anything+ which should not be in harmony with what is really good.+ But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable that which was said by the comic writer. +Thus even the many perceive the difference.+ For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly and wittily.  Go on then and ask if we should value and think those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied,—­that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.

13.  I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence out of non-existence.  Every part of me then will be reduced by change into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another part of the universe, and so on forever.  And by consequence of such a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the other direction.  For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the universe is administered according to definite periods [of revolution].

14.  Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are sufficient for themselves and for their own works.  They move then from a first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are named Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed by the right road.

15.  None of these things ought to be called a man’s, which do not belong to a man, as man.  They are not required of a man, nor does man’s nature promise them, nor are they the means of man’s nature attaining its end.  Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids toward this end is that which is good.  Besides, if any of these things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who snowed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good.  But now the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man.