9.  This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind of a part it is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are according to the nature of which thou art a part.

10.  Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—­such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—­says, like a true philosopher, that the offenses which are committed through desire are more blamable than those which are committed through anger.  For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more womanish in his offences.  Rightly, then, and in a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed with pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed with pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry, but the other is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something by desire.

11.  Since it is possible[A] that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly.[B] But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence?  But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in man’s power to enable him not to fall into real evils.  And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be altogether in a man’s power not to fall into it.  Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s life worse?  But neither through ignorance, nor—­having the knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad.  But death certainly, and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,—­all these things equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better nor worse.  Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

    [A] Or it may mean, “since it is in thy power to depart;” which
    gives a meaning somewhat different.

    [B] See Cicero, Tuscul., i. 49.