Antoninus’ opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed.  His doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does not perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish.  The opinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides; what comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven, the divinity, returns to him who gave it.  But I find nothing clear in Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of clay.  He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and consistent with the university of things.

Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics practised,—­the anticipating the regular course of nature by a man’s own act.  The reader will find some passages in which this is touched on, and he may make of them what he can.  But there are passages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end patiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with all his best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot and do useful acts as he lives.  He should not therefore abridge the time of his usefulness by his own act.  Whether he contemplates any possible cases in which a man should die by his own hand, I cannot tell; and the matter is not worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not lead to any certain result as to his opinion on this point.  I do not think that Antoninus, who never mentions Seneca, though he must have known all about him, would have agreed with Seneca when he gives as a reason for suicide, that the eternal law, whatever he means, has made nothing better for us than this, that it has given us only one way of entering into life and many ways of going out of it.  The ways of going out indeed are many, and that is a good reason for a man taking care of himself.[A]

    [A] See Plinius H.N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6; and
    Ep. 70:  “Nihil melius aeterna lex,” &c.

Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic’s life.  There is no rule of life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own happiness.  Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are only seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the strongest that they have.  The end of a man is, as already explained, to live conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind, and contentment (iii. 12; viii. 1, and other places).  As a means of living conformably to nature he must study the four chief virtues, each of which has its proper sphere:  wisdom, or the knowledge of good and evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due; fortitude, or the enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is moderation in all things.  By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic obtained all that he wished or expected.  His reward was in his virtuous life, and he was satisfied with that.  Some Greek poet long ago wrote:—­