which are necessary for all these functions.  Knowing nothing then of the unseen power which acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all space; but seeing that there is a nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal Nature has a cause which operates continually, and that we are totally unable to speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which we perceive.  This I believe is the answer which may be collected from all that Antoninus has said.[A]

    [A] Cleanthes says in his Hymn:—­

    “For all things good and bad to One thou formest,
    So that One everlasting reason governs all.”

    See Bishop Butler’s Sermons.  Sermon xv., “Upon the Ignorance of
    Man.”

The origin of evil is an old question.  Achilles tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and that he gives to men out of each according to his pleasure; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus.  One of the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile this doctrine with what we find in the first book of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they bring it on themselves through their own folly.  The answer is plain enough even to the Greek commentator.  The poets make both Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately to their several characters.  Indeed, Zeus says plainly that men do attribute their sufferings to their gods, but they do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows.

[Illustration:  The Appian way, Rome]

Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of the question of evil.  He says, “As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.”  This will appear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but he always knows what he is talking about.  We do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though we may miss it.  God, whose existence Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his purpose shall fail.  Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of evil, as he expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the constitution or nature of things.  If there were a principle of evil ([Greek:  arche]) in the constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius argues, but evil would be good.  Simplicius (c. 34, [27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text of Epictetus, and it is amusing and instructive.