and injuries, and his precepts are practical.
He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his
lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the
being and the government of God as to him who believes
in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus
to the objections which may be made to the existence
and providence of God because of the moral disorder
and suffering which are in the world, except this
answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that
even the best men may be extinguished by death.
He says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought
to have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered
it otherwise (xii. 5). His conviction of the wisdom
which we may observe in the government of the world
is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities
in the order of things. That these disorders
exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from
them against the being and government of God conclude
too hastily. We all admit that there is an order
in the material world, a Nature, in the sense in which
that word has been explained, a constitution ([Greek:
kataskeue]), what we call a system, a relation of
parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for
something. So in the constitution of plants and
of animals there is an order, a fitness for some end.
Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted,
and the end, as we conceive it, is not attained.
The seed, the plant, or the animal sometimes perishes
before it has passed through all its changes and done
all its uses. It is according to Nature, that
is a fixed order, for some to perish early and for
others to do all their uses and leave successors to
take their place. So man has a corporeal and
intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain
uses, and on the whole man performs these uses, dies,
and leaves other men in his place. So society
exists, and a social state is manifestly the natural
state of man—the state for which his nature
fits him, and society amidst innumerable irregularities
and disorders still subsists; and perhaps we may say
that the history of the past and our present knowledge
give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will
diminish, and that order, its governing principle,
may be more firmly established. As order then,
a fixed order, we may say, subject to deviations real
or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole
nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil,
as it seems to us, does not in any way alter the fact
of the general constitution of things having a nature
or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the
existence of disorder that order is not the rule, for
the existence of order both physical and moral is
proved by daily experience and all past experience.
We cannot conceive how the order of the universe is
maintained: we cannot even conceive how our own
life from day to day is continued, nor how we perform
the simplest movements of the body, nor how we grow
and think and act, though we know many of the conditions