When I say that half of the property of this country is disfranchised, I mean that the nature of this property is such that it is peculiarly subject to the power of rulers, and that the owners of it have hardly any legitimate way of defending it against the arbitrary exercise of this power.  The corporation is created by the legislature; men cannot combine their capitals and avoid unlimited liability for the debts of the combination, unless the law specifically authorizes the proceeding.  Of course, if the legislature has power to make such grants, it must have power to alter them.  In short, property held by a corporation is held at the will of the legislature, and in a way and to an extent that property held by an individual is not.  It is not very easy for the legislature to plunder or blackmail individuals, even when they are disfranchised, because it has to be done by general laws, and direct methods arouse direct opposition.  But, as we have seen, stockholders as a class cannot defend their rights, and as things are now, their trustees cannot have much to say concerning the laws that affect their property.  Managers of large corporations are now commonly denounced as unfit to be legislators, and are practically excluded from the halls of legislation.  In some states they are even specifically disfranchised, so far as holding office is concerned, and, under the new despotism, ironically dubbed the new freedom, every man whose wealth and ability make his aid important to many enterprises, is to be forbidden to participate in more than one.  Yet property is almost entirely subject to the disposition of the legislature! not entirely, for the courts afford some protection; but even this is now threatened:  we may “progress” so far as to make it unconstitutional for a judge to declare any law unconstitutional.

It goes without saying that half the property of the country will not submit to spoliation without a struggle.  If it cannot have representation legitimately, it will try to get it illegitimately or extra legitimately.  The managers of corporations have in the past found many ways to influence legislation.  Despite the prejudices against them, some of them have had themselves chosen as legislators; even as judges.  Some have brought about the election of legislators who would act in their favor, and have even bribed legislators.  Until recently it was not even unlawful for these managers to use the money of their stockholders in political contributions; some managers acted on the “Good Lord!  Good Devil!” principle.  Probably most of the politicians paid no railroad fares.  Many of them got passes for their families and their friends; and it was certainly to be expected that they should listen to the requests of those who granted these favors.  The situation became grotesque when a great ruler, seeking a nomination to office with the proclaimed purpose of enforcing the laws against rebates and passes, required the railroad managers to furnish him free transportation on his righteous mission.