shall organise governments in these States, which are absolutely without loyal governments, we are met by the objection founded on State Rights.  The same disastrous voice which from the beginning of our history has sounded in our ears still makes itself heard; but, alas! it is now on the lips of our friends.  Of course, just in proportion as it prevails will it be impossible to establish the Constitution again throughout the Rebel States.  State Rights are madly triumphant, if, first, in their name Rebel governments can be organized, and then, again, in their name Congressional governments to displace the Rebel governments can be resisted.  If they can be employed, first to sever the States from the Union, and then to prevent the Union from extending its power over them, State Rights are at once a sword and buckler to the Rebellion.  It was through the imbecility of Mr. Buchanan that the States were allowed to use the sword.  God forbid that now, through any similar imbecility of Congress, they shall be allowed to use the buckler!

SHALL CONGRESS ASSUME JURISDICTION OF THE REBEL STATES?

And now, in this discussion, we are brought to the practical question which is destined to occupy so much of public attention.  It is proposed to bring the action of Congress to bear directly upon the Rebel States.  This may be by the establishment of provisional governments under the authority of Congress, or simply by making the admission or recognition of the States depend upon the action of Congress.  The essential feature of this proposition is, that Congress shall assume jurisdiction of the Rebel States.  A bill authorizing provisional governments in these States was introduced into the Senate by Mr. Harris of the State of New York, and was afterwards reported from the Judiciary Committee of that body; but it was left with the unfinished business, when the late Congress expired on the fourth of March.  The opposition to this proposition, so far as I understand it, assumes two forms:  first, that these States are always to be regarded as States, with State rights, and therefore cannot be governed by Congress; and, secondly, that, if any government is to be established over them, it must be simply a military government, with a military governor, appointed by the President, as is the case with Tennessee and North Carolina.  But State rights are as much disturbed by a military government as by a Congressional government.  The local government is as much set aside in one case as in the other.  If the President, within State limits, can proceed to organize a military government to exercise all the powers of the State, surely Congress can proceed to organize a civil government within the same limits for the same purpose; nor can any pretension of State Rights be effective against Congress more than against the President.  Indeed, the power belongs to Congress by a higher title than it belongs to the President:  first, because a civil government is more in harmony with our institutions, and, wherever possible, is required; and, secondly, because there are provisions of the Constitution under which this power is clearly derived.