It has not generally been observed that before the great battle General Meade was in a position seriously to threaten the Confederate rear.  Armies in the field rarely meet each other at the place and time expected.  There is always something obscure and uncertain in the oncoming of the actual conflict.  The fact is that General Lee was receding somewhat at the time of the crisis.  Then it was that he determined to fight a great battle, and if successful then march on Washington.  Should he not be successful, he would keep a way open by direct route for retreat into Virginia.

By the first of July, 1863, a situation had been prepared which signified a decisive battle with far-reaching consequences to the one side or the other, accordingly as victory should incline to this or to that.  By this date General Reynolds, who commanded the advance line of the Union army, met the corresponding line of the Confederates at the village of Gettysburg, and the rest followed as if by logical necessity.

On July 1 and 2, the great body of the Union and Confederate armies came up to the position where battle had already begun between the advance divisions and the pressure of the one side upon the other became greater and greater with each hour.  At the first the Confederate impact was strongest.  General Reynolds was killed.  Reinforcements were hurried up on both sides.  General Howard, who succeeded Reynolds, selected Cemetery Hill, south of the town of Gettysburg, and there established the Union line.

General Meade arrived on the field on the afternoon of the first, and the two armies were thrown rapidly into position.  That of the Federals extended in the form of a fishhook from Little Round Top by way of Round Top and along Cemetery Ridge through the cemetery itself, by the way of the gate, and then bending to the right, formed the bowl of the hook, which extended around as far as Culp’s Hill and Wolf Creek.  The ground was elevated and the convexity was toward the enemy.

By nightfall of the first, both armies were in state of readiness for the conflict.  The Union army was on the defensive.  It was sufficient that it should hold its ground and repel all assault.  The Confederates must advance and carry the Federal position in order to succeed.  How this should be done was not agreed on by the Confederate commanders.  General Lee formed a plan of direct assault; but General Longstreet was of opinion that a movement of the army to the Union left flank would be preferable, and that by that method the flank might be turned and the position of Meade carried with less loss and much less hazard.