to afford one of the few obvious and certain sources for Reparation.  Much time was expended in the exploration of all possible alternatives; but it was evident at last that, even if German exports and saleable foreign securities had been available to a sufficient value, they could not be liquidated in time, and that the financial exhaustion of Germany was so complete that nothing whatever was immediately available in substantial amounts except the gold in the Reichsbank.  Accordingly a sum exceeding $250,000,000 in all out of the Reichsbank gold was transferred by Germany to the Allies (chiefly to the United States, Great Britain, however, also receiving a substantial sum) during the first six months of 1919 in payment for foodstuffs.

But this was not all.  Although Germany agreed, under the first extension of the Armistice, not to export gold without Allied permission, this permission could not be always withheld.  There were liabilities of the Reichsbank accruing in the neighboring neutral countries, which could not be met otherwise than in gold.  The failure of the Reichsbank to meet its liabilities would have caused a depreciation of the exchange so injurious to Germany’s credit as to react on the future prospects of Reparation.  In some cases, therefore, permission to export gold was accorded to the Reichsbank by the Supreme Economic Council of the Allies.

The net result of these various measures was to reduce the gold reserve of the Reichsbank by more than half, the figures falling from $575,000,000 to $275,000,000 in September, 1919.

It would be possible under the Treaty to take the whole of this latter sum for Reparation purposes.  It amounts, however, as it is, to less than 4 per cent of the Reichsbank’s Note Issue, and the psychological effect of its total confiscation might be expected (having regard to the very large volume of mark notes held abroad) to destroy the exchange value of the mark almost entirely.  A sum of $25,000,000, $50,000,000, or even $100,000,000 might be taken for a special purpose.  But we may assume that the Reparation Commission will judge it imprudent, having regard to the reaction on their future prospects of securing payment, to ruin the German currency system altogether, more particularly because the French and Belgian Governments, being holders of a very large volume of mark notes formerly circulating in the occupied or ceded territory, have a great interest in maintaining some exchange value for the mark, quite apart from Reparation prospects.

It follows, therefore, that no sum worth speaking of can be expected in the form of gold or silver towards the initial payment of $5,000,000,000 due by 1921.

(b) Shipping.—­Germany has engaged, as we have seen above, to surrender to the Allies virtually the whole of her merchant shipping.  A considerable part of it, indeed, was already in the hands of the Allies prior to the conclusion of Peace, either by detention in their ports or by the provisional transfer of tonnage under the Brussels Agreement in connection with the supply of foodstuffs.[119] Estimating the tonnage of German shipping to be taken over under the Treaty at 4,000,000 gross tons, and the average value per ton at $150 per ton, the total money value involved is $600,000,000.[120]