[41] It must not be overlooked, however, that, amongst the other concessions relating to Silesia accorded in the Allies’ Final Note, there has been included Article 90, by which “Poland undertakes to permit for a period of fifteen years the exportation to Germany of the products of the mines in any part of Upper Silesia transferred to Poland in accordance with the present Treaty.  Such products shall be free from all export duties or other charges or restrictions on exportation.  Poland agrees to take such steps as may be necessary to secure that any such products shall be available for sale to purchasers in Germany on terms as favorable as are applicable to like products sold under similar conditions to purchasers in Poland or in any other country.”  This does not apparently amount to a right of preemption, and it is not easy to estimate its effective practical consequences.  It is evident, however, that in so far as the mines are maintained at their former efficiency, and in so far as Germany is in a position to purchase substantially her former supplies from that source, the loss is limited to the effect on her balance of trade, and is without the more serious repercussions on her economic life which are contemplated in the text.  Here is an opportunity for the Allies to render more tolerable the actual operation of the settlement.  The Germans, it should be added, have pointed out that the same economic argument which adds the Saar fields to France allots Upper Silesia to Germany.  For whereas the Silesian mines are essential to the economic life of Germany, Poland does not need them.  Of Poland’s pre-war annual demand of 10,500,000 tons, 6,800,000 tons were supplied by the indisputably Polish districts adjacent to Upper Silesia. 1,500,000 tons from Upper Silesia (out of a total Upper Silesian output of 43,500,000 tons), and the balance from what is now Czecho-Slovakia.  Even without any supply from Upper Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia, Poland could probably meet her requirements by the fuller exploitation of her own coalfields which are not yet scientifically developed, or from the deposits of Western Galicia which are now to be annexed to her.

[42] France is also to receive annually for three years 35,000 tons of benzol, 60,000 tons of coal tar, and 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia.

[43] The Reparation Commission is authorized under the Treaty (Part VIII Annex V. para. 10) “to postpone or to cancel deliveries” if they consider “that the full exercise of the foregoing options would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany.”  In the event of such postponements or cancellations “the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over other deliveries.”  This concluding clause is of the greatest importance, if, as will be seen, it is physically impossible for Germany to furnish the full 45,000,000; for it means that France will receive 20,000,000 tons before Italy receives anything.  The Reparation Commission has no discretion to modify this.  The Italian Press has not failed to notice the significance of the provision, and alleges that this clause was inserted during the absence of the Italian representatives from Paris (Corriere della Sera, July 19, 1919).