(ii.) The clauses relating to Railways, as originally presented to Germany, were substantially modified in the final Treaty, and are now limited to a provision by which goods, coming from Allied territory to Germany, or in transit through Germany, shall receive the most favored treatment as regards rail freight rates, etc., applied to goods of the same kind carried on any German lines “under similar conditions of transport, for example, as regards length of route."[62] As a non-reciprocal provision this is an act of interference in internal arrangements which it is difficult to justify, but the practical effect of this,[63] and of an analogous provision relating to passenger traffic,[64] will much depend on the interpretation of the phrase, “similar conditions of transport."[65]

For the time being Germany’s transport system will be much more seriously disordered by the provisions relating to the cession of rolling-stock.  Under paragraph 7 of the Armistice conditions Germany was called on to surrender 5000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons, “in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings.”  Under the Treaty Germany is required to confirm this surrender and to recognize the title of the Allies to the material.[66] She is further required, in the case of railway systems in ceded territory, to hand over these systems complete with their full complement of rolling-stock “in a normal state of upkeep” as shown in the last inventory before November 11, 1918.[67] That is to say, ceded railway systems are not to bear any share in the general depletion and deterioration of the German rolling-stock as a whole.

This is a loss which in course of time can doubtless be made good.  But lack of lubricating oils and the prodigious wear and tear of the war, not compensated by normal repairs, had already reduced the German railway system to a low state of efficiency.  The further heavy losses under the Treaty will confirm this state of affairs for some time to come, and are a substantial aggravation of the difficulties of the coal problem and of export industry generally.

(iii.) There remain the clauses relating to the river system of Germany.  These are largely unnecessary and are so little related to the supposed aims of the Allies that their purport is generally unknown.  Yet they constitute an unprecedented interference with a country’s domestic arrangements and are capable of being so operated as to take from Germany all effective control over her own transport system.  In their present form they are incapable of justification; but some simple changes might transform them into a reasonable instrument.