This comparison, however, requires substantial modification to make it accurate.  On the one hand, it is certain that the figures of pre-war output cannot be relied on as a basis of present output.  During 1918 the production was 161,500,000 tons as compared with 191,500,000 tons in 1913; and during the first half of 1919 it was less than 50,000,000 tons, exclusive of Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar but including Upper Silesia, corresponding to an annual production of about 100,000,000 tons.[44] The causes of so low an output were in part temporary and exceptional but the German authorities agree, and have not been confuted, that some of them are bound to persist for some time to come.  In part they are the same as elsewhere; the daily shift has been shortened from 8-1/2 to 7 hours, and it is improbable that the powers of the Central Government will be adequate to restore them to their former figure.  But in addition, the mining plant is in bad condition (due to the lack of certain essential materials during the blockade), the physical efficiency of the men is greatly impaired by malnutrition (which cannot be cured if a tithe of the reparation demands are to be satisfied,—­the standard of life will have rather to be lowered), and the casualties of the war have diminished the numbers of efficient miners.  The analogy of English conditions is sufficient by itself to tell us that a pre-war level of output cannot be expected in Germany.  German authorities put the loss of output at somewhat above 30 per cent, divided about equally between the shortening of the shift and the other economic influences.  This figure appears on general grounds to be plausible, but I have not the knowledge to endorse or to criticize it.

The pre-war figure of 118,000,000 tons net (i.e. after allowing for loss of territory and consumption at the mines) is likely to fall, therefore, at least as low as to 100,000,000[45] tons, having regard to the above factors.  If 40,000,000 tons of this are to be exported to the Allies, there remain 60,000,000 tons for Germany herself to meet her own domestic consumption.  Demand as well as supply will be diminished by loss of territory, but at the most extravagant estimate this could not be put above 29,000,000 tons.[46] Our hypothetical calculations, therefore, leave us with post-war German domestic requirements, on the basis of a pre-war efficiency of railways and industry, of 110,000,000 tons against an output rot exceeding 100,000,000 tons, of which 40,000,000 tons are mortgaged to the Allies.

The importance of the subject has led me into a somewhat lengthy statistical analysis.  It is evident that too much significance must not be attached to the precise figures arrived at, which are hypothetical and dubious.[47] But the general character of the facts presents itself irresistibly.  Allowing for the loss of territory and the loss of efficiency, Germany cannot export coal in the near future (and will even