[124] In all these estimates, I am conscious of being driven by a fear of overstating the case against the Treaty, of giving figures in excess of my own real judgment.  There is a great difference between putting down on paper fancy estimates of Germany’s resources and actually extracting contributions in the form of cash.  I do not myself believe that the Reparation Commission will secure real resources from the above items by May, 1921, even as great as the lower of the two figures given above.

[125] The Treaty (see Art. 114) leaves it very dubious how far the Danish Government is under an obligation to make payments to the Reparation Commission in respect of its acquisition of Schleswig.  They might, for instance, arrange for various offsets such as the value of the mark notes held by the inhabitants of ceded areas.  In any case the amount of money involved is quite small.  The Danish Government is raising a loan for $33,000,000 (kr. 120,000,000) for the joint purposes of “taking over Schleswig’s share of the German debt, for buying German public property, for helping the Schleswig population, and for settling the currency question.”

[126] Here again my own judgment would carry me much further and I should doubt the possibility of Germany’s exports equaling her imports during this period.  But the statement in the text goes far enough for the purpose of my argument.

[127] It has been estimated that the cession of territory to France, apart from the loss of Upper Silesia, may reduce Germany’s annual pre-war production of steel ingots from 20,000,000 tons to 14,000,000 tons, and increase France’s capacity from 5,000,000 tons to 11,000,000 tons.

[128] Germany’s exports of sugar in 1913 amounted to 1,110,073 tons of the value of $65,471,500, of which 838,583 tons were exported to the United Kingdom at a value of $45,254,000.  These figures were in excess of the normal, the average total exports for the five years ending 1913 being about $50,000,000.

[129] The necessary price adjustment, which is required, on both sides of this account, will be made en bloc later.

[130] If the amount of the sinking fund be reduced, and the annual payment is continued over a greater number of years, the present value—­so powerful is the operation of compound interest—­cannot be materially increased.  A payment of $500,000,000 annually in perpetuity, assuming interest, as before, at 5 per cent, would only raise the present value to $10,000,000,000.

[131] As an example of public misapprehension on economic affairs, the following letter from Sir Sidney Low to The Times of the 3rd December, 1918, deserves quotation:  “I have seen authoritative estimates which place the gross value of Germany’s mineral and chemical resources as high as $1,250,000,000,000 or even more; and the Ruhr basin mines alone are said to be worth over $225,000,000,000.  It is certain,