The Economic Consequences of the Peace eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 239 pages of information about The Economic Consequences of the Peace.

The Economic Consequences of the Peace eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 239 pages of information about The Economic Consequences of the Peace.

[103] In conversation with Frenchmen who were private persons and quite unaffected by political considerations, this aspect became very clear.  You might persuade them that some current estimates as to the amount to be got out of Germany were quite fantastic.  Yet at the end they would always come back to where they had started:  “But Germany must pay; for, otherwise, what is to happen to France?”

[104] A further paragraph claims the war costs of Belgium “in accordance with Germany’s pledges, already given, as to complete restoration for Belgium.”

[105] The challenge of the other Allies, as well as the enemy, had to be met; for in view of the limited resources of the latter, the other Allies had perhaps a greater interest than the enemy in seeing that no one of their number established an excessive claim.

[106] M. Klotz has estimated the French claims on this head at $15,000,000,000 (75 milliard francs, made up of 13 milliard for allowances, 60 for pensions, and 2 for widows).  If this figure is correct, the others should probably be scaled up also.

[107] That is to say, I claim for the aggregate figure an accuracy within 25 per cent.

[108] In his speech of September 5, 1919, addressed to the French Chamber, M. Klotz estimated the total Allied claims against Germany under the Treaty at $75,000,000,000, which would accumulate at interest until 1921, and be paid off thereafter by 34 annual installments of about $5,000,000,000 each, of which France would receive about $2,750,000,000 annually.  “The general effect of the statement (that France would receive from Germany this annual payment) proved,” it is reported, “appreciably encouraging to the country as a whole, and was immediately reflected in the improved tone on the Bourse and throughout the business world in France.”  So long as such statements can be accepted in Paris without protest, there can be no financial or economic future for France, and a catastrophe of disillusion is not far distant.

[109] As a matter of subjective judgment, I estimate for this figure an accuracy of 10 per cent in deficiency and 20 per cent in excess, i.e. that the result will lie between $32,000,000,000 and $44,000,000,000.

[110] Germany is also liable under the Treaty, as an addition to her liabilities for Reparation, to pay all the costs of the Armies of Occupation after Peace is signed for the fifteen subsequent years of occupation.  So far as the text of the Treaty goes, there is nothing to limit the size of these armies, and France could, therefore, by quartering the whole of her normal standing army in the occupied area, shift the charge from her own taxpayers to those of Germany,—­though in reality any such policy would be at the expense not of Germany, who by hypothesis is already paying for Reparation up to the full limit of her capacity, but of France’s Allies, who would receive so much less in respect of Reparation. 

Copyrights
Project Gutenberg
The Economic Consequences of the Peace from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.