against those defended his native countrey and State,
and this suffic’d him alone, that as the danger
came upon him, he secur’d himself of a fewer;
whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had
nothing availd him. And let no man think to overthrow
this my opinion with that common proverb, that He
who relyes upon the people, layes his foundation in
the dirt; for that is true where a private Citizen
grounds upon them, making his account that the people
shall free him, when either his enemyes or the Magistrates
oppresse him: In this case he should find himself
often deceiv’d, as it befell the Gracchyes in
Rome, and in Florence George Scali: but he being
a Prince that grounds thereupon, who can command,
and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him
in his adversityes, and wants not other preparations,
and holds together the whole multitude animated with
his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv’d
by them, and shall find he hath layd good foundations.
These Principalityes are wont to be upon the point
of falling when they goe about to skip from the civil
order to the absolute: for these Princes either
command of themselves, or by the Magistrate; in this
last case their State is more weak and dangerous,
because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure
of these Citizens, who then are set over the Magistrates,
who especially in adverse times are able with facility
to take their State from them either by rising up
against them, or by not obeying them; and then the
Prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the
absolute authority upon him: for the Citizens
and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands
from the Magistrates, are not like in those fractions
to obey his: and in doubtfull times he shall
alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust;
for such a Prince cannot ground upon that which he
sees in peaceable times, when the Citizens have need
of the State; for then every one runs, and every one
promises, and every one will venture his life for
him, where there is no danger neare; but in times of
hazzard, when the State hath need of Citizens, there
are but few of them then, and so much the more is
this experience dangerous, in that it can be but once
made. Therefore a prudent Prince ought to devise
a way whereby his Citizens alwayes and in any case
and quality of time may have need of his government,
and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him.
CHAP. X
In what manner the Forces of all Principalities ought to be measured.
It is requisite in examining the quality of those Principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a Prince have such dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself, or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him. And to cleer this point the better, I judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity