“As the neutrals quietly acquiesced when there was a question of abandoning trade with the Central Powers they have remedies in hand for the losses of ships which affect them so deeply.  They need only consider the fact that the German submarines on the high seas are able to prevent war services to the enemy in the shipments of contraband goods, in a manner that is both militarily and from the standpoint of international law, irreproachable.  If they agree to desist from the shipment of contraband goods and cease yielding to British pressure then they will not have to complain of losses in ships and can retain the same for peaceful aims.”

This was aimed especially at America.  Naval critics did not permit the opportunity to pass to call to the attention of the Government that Germany’s promises in the Sussex case were only conditional and that, therefore, they could be broken at any time.  The Chancellor was in a most difficult situation; so was von Hindenburg and the Kaiser.  On December 10th it was announced that the Reichstag would be called to a special session on the twelfth and that the Chancellor would discuss the international situation as it was affected by the Roumanian campaign.

The meeting of December 12th was the best attended and most impressive one of the Reichstag since August 4th, 1914.  Before the Chancellor left his palace he called the representatives of the neutral nations and handed them Germany’s peace proposal.  The same day Germany sent to every part of the globe through her wireless stations, Germany’s note to the Allies and the Chancellor’s address.

The world was astonished and surprised at the German move but no one knew whether it was to be taken seriously.  Great Britain instructed her embassies and legations in neutral countries to attempt to find out whether the Chancellor really desired to make peace or whether his statements were to be interpreted as something to quiet internal troubles.

During the days of discussion which followed I was in close touch with the Foreign Office, the American Embassy and the General Staff.  The first intimation I received that Germany did not expect the peace plan to succeed was on December 14th at a meeting of the neutral correspondents with Lieut.  Col. von Haeften.  When von Hindenburg became Chief of the General Staff he reorganised the press department in Berlin and sent von Haeften from his personal staff to Berlin to direct the press propaganda.  As a student of public opinion abroad von Haeften was a genius and was extremely frank and honest with the correspondents.