“We did not sink the Sussex.  I am as convinced of that as of anything which has happened in this war.  If you read the definite instructions, the exact orders each submarine commander has you would understand that the torpedoing of the Sussex was impossible.  Many of our submarines have returned from rounding up British vessels.  They sighted scores of passenger ships going between England and America but not one of these was touched.

“We have definitely agreed to warn the crews and passengers of passenger liners.  We have lived up to that promise in every way.  We are not out to torpedo without warning neutral ships bound for England.  Our submarines have respected every one of them so far, and they have met scores in the North Sea, the Channel and the Atlantic.”

On the same day that Ambassador Gerard handed von Jagow Secretary Lansing’s note, Under Secretary of State Zimmermann approved the von Holtzendorff interview.  Zimmermann could not make himself believe that a German submarine was responsible and the Government had decided to disavow all responsibility.  But such convincing reports began to arrive from the United States and from neutral European countries which proved beyond a doubt that a German submarine was responsible, that the Government had to again bring up the submarine issue at Great Headquarters.  When the von Holtzendorff interview was published in the United States it caused a sensation because if Germany maintained the attitude which the Chief of the Admiralty Staff had taken with the approval of the Foreign Office, a break in diplomatic relations could not be avoided.  Secretary Lansing telegraphed Ambassador Gerard to inquire at the Foreign Office whether the statements of von Holtzendorff represented the opinions of the German Government.  Gerard called me to the Embassy but before I arrived Dr. Heckscher, of the Reichstag Foreign Relations Committee, came.  Gerard called me in in Heckscher’s presence to ask if I knew that the von Holtzendorff interview would bring about a break in diplomatic relations unless it was immediately disavowed.  He told Dr. Heckscher to inform Zimmermann that if the Chief of the Admiralty Staff was going to direct Germany’s foreign policies he would ask his government to accredit him to the naval authorities and not to the Foreign Office.  Heckscher would not believe my statement that Zimmermann had approved the interview and assured Gerard that within a very short time the Foreign Office would disavow von Holtzendorff’s statements.  When he arrived at the Foreign Office, however, Zimmermann not only refused to disavow the Admiral’s statement but informed Heckscher that he had the same opinions.

President Wilson was at the end of his patience.  Probably he began to doubt whether he could rely upon the reports of Ambassador Gerard that there was a chance of the democratic forces in Germany coming out ahead of the military caste.  Wilson showed his attitude plainly in the Sussex note when he said: