The opposition was led by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz.  He was supported by General von Falkenhayn, Field Marshal von Mackensen and all army generals; Admirals von Pohl and von Bachmann; Major Bassermann, leader of the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag; Dr. Gustav Stressemann, member of the Reichstag and Director of the North German Lloyd Steamship Company; and von Heydebrand, the so-called “Uncrowned King of Prussia,” because of his control of the Prussian Diet.

With these forces against each other the internal fight continued more bitter than ever.  President Wilson kept insisting upon definite promises from Germany but the Admiralty still had the upper hand.  There was nothing for the Foreign Office to do except to make the best possible excuses and depend upon Wilson’s patience to give them time to get into the saddle.  The Navy Department, however, was so confident that it had the Kaiser’s support in everything it did, that one of the submarines was instructed to sink the Arabic.

President Wilson’s note in the Arabic case again brought the submarine dispute within Germany to a head.  Conferences were again held at Great Headquarters.  The Chancellor, von Jagow, Helfferich, von Tirpitz and other leaders were summoned by the Kaiser.  On the 28th of August I succeeded in sending by courier to The Hague the following despatch: 

“With the support of the Kaiser, the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, is expected to win the fight he is now making for a modification of Germany’s submarine warfare that will forever settle the difficulties with America over the sinking of the Lusitania and the Arabic.  Both the Chancellor and von Jagow are most anxious to end at once and for all time the controversies with Washington desiring America’s friendship.” (Published in the Chicago Tribune, August 29th, 1915.)

“The Marine Department, headed by von Tirpitz, creator of the submarine policy, will oppose any disavowal of the action of German’s submarines.  But the Kaiser is expected to approve the steps the Chancellor and Foreign Secretary contemplate taking, swinging the balance in favour of von Bethmann-Hollweg’s contention that ships in the future must be warned before they are torpedoed.”

One day I went to the Foreign Office and told one of the officials I believed that if the American people knew what a difficult time the Foreign Office was having in trying to win out over the Admiralty that public opinion in the United States might be mobilised to help the Foreign Office against the Admiralty.  I took with me a brief despatch which I asked him to pass.  He censored it with the understanding that I would never disclose his name in case the despatch was read in Germany.

A few days later the Manchester, England, Guardian arrived containing my article, headed as follows: 

  HOLLWEG’S CHANGE OF TUNE

  Respect for Scraps of Paper