“The United States might have blundered into the war at any time during the past two years, but to have entered, as it is now doing, at the right time and in the clear interest of a purely international programme required the exercise of an intellectualised and imaginative leadership.  And in supplying the country with this leadership Mr. Wilson was interpreting the ideas of thoughtful Americans who wished their country to be fighting on the side of international right, but not until the righteousness of the Allied cause was unequivocally established.  It has taken some time to reach this assurance.  The war originated in conflicting national ambitions among European Powers for privileged economic and political positions in Africa and Asia, and if it had continued to be a war of this kind there never could have been a question of American intervention.  Germany, however, had been dreaming of a more glorious goal than Bagdad and a mightier heritage than that of Turkey.  She betrayed her dream by attacking France through Belgium and by threatening the foundations of European order.  The crucifying of Belgium established a strong presumption against Germany, but the case was not complete.  There still remained the dubious origin of the war.  There still remained a doubt whether the defeat of German militarism might not mean a dangerous triumph of Russian autocracy.  Above all there remained a more serious doubt whether the United States in aiding the Allies to beat Germany might not be contributing merely to the establishment of a new and equally unstable and demoralising Balance of Power in Europe.  It was well, consequently, to wait and see whether the development of the war would not do away with some of the ambiguities and misgivings, while at the same time to avoid doing anything to embarrass the Allies.  The waiting policy has served.  Germany was driven by the logic of her original aggression to threaten the security of all neutrals connected with the rest of the world by maritime communications.  The Russian autocracy was overthrown, because it betrayed its furtive kinship with the German autocracy.  Finally, President Wilson used the waiting period for the education of American public opinion.  His campaign speeches prophesied the abandonment of American isolation in the interest of a League of Peace.  His note of last December to the belligerents brought out the sinister secrecy of German peace terms and the comparative frankness of that of the Allies.  His address to the Senate clearly enunciated the only programme on behalf of which America could intervene in European affairs.  Never was there a purer and more successful example of Fabian political strategy, for Fabianism consists not merely in waiting but in preparing during the meantime for the successful application of a plan to a confused and dangerous situation.