The Court in its decision followed the reasoning of the Cummings case and held the law invalid, as applied to the exercise of the petitioner’s right to practice his profession; that such right was not a mere indulgence, a matter of grace and favor, revocable at the pleasure of the Court, or at the command of the legislature; but was a right of which the petitioner could be deprived only by the judgment of the Court for moral or professional delinquency.  The Court also held that the pardon of the petitioner released him from all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason committed by his participation in the rebellion, and that, so far as that offence was concerned, he was placed beyond the reach of punishment of any kind.  But to exclude him by reason of that offence—­that is, by requiring him to take an oath that he had never committed it—­was to enforce a punishment for it notwithstanding the pardon; and that it was not within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency.

I had the honor to deliver the opinion of the Court in these cases—­the Cummings case and the Garland case.  At the present day both opinions are generally admitted to be sound, but when announced they were received by a portion of the Northern Press with apparent astonishment and undisguised condemnation.  It is difficult to appreciate at this day the fierceness with which the majority of the Court was assailed.  That majority consisted of Justices Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Clifford, and myself.  I was particularly taken to task, however, as it was supposed—­at least I can only so infer from the tone of the Press—­that because I had been appointed by Mr. Lincoln, I was under some sort of moral obligation to support all the measures taken by the States or by Congress during the war.  The following, respecting the opinion in the Garland case, from the editor of the Daily Chronicle, of Washington, to the Press, of Philadelphia, under date of January 16, 1867, is moderate in its language compared with what appeared in many other journals: 

“Dred Scott Number Three has just been enacted in the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Field, of California, taking the leading part as the representative of the majority decision against the constitutionality of the iron-clad test-oath, to prevent traitors from practicing before that high tribunal.  I understand it takes the ground that, as the law is a living or profession, the oath cannot be insisted upon to take that living away, and that the President’s pardon restores all such rights.  The country has been repeatedly admonished that such a decision would be made about this time; nevertheless, a very considerable sensation was created when it was officially enunciated.  All these movements are but preparations for a counter-revolution in the interest of slavery and treason.” ——­ “I learn that the opinion of Justice Field against the test-oath, like that