too coarse and vulgar to be repeated, that he would do sundry terrible things to those who should obstruct him on his way to his wife.  As she was then in the custody of the marshal and in his office, under an order of the court; and as Terry had resisted her arrest and removal from the court-room until overpowered by several strong men, and as he had instantly on being released rushed madly from the court-room, drawing and brandishing his knife as he went, the conclusion is irresistible that he was determined upon her rescue from the marshal, if, with the aid of his knife, he could accomplish it.  That Mr. Montgomery allowed these facts, which constitute the offense of an assault with a deadly weapon, to go unchallenged, compels us to the charitable presumption that he did not know the law.

A reading of the decisions on this subject would have taught him that in order to constitute that offense it is not necessary that the assailant should actually stab with his knife or shoot with his pistol.  The assault by Terry was commenced in the court-room, under the eyes of the judges, and was a continuing act, ending only-with the wrenching of the knife from his hands.  It was all committed “in the presence of the court,” for the Supreme Court has decided in the Savin case that “the jury-room and hallway were parts of the place in which the court was required by law to hold its sessions, and that the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use and for the use of its officers, jurors, and witnesses, and that misbehavior in such a place is misbehavior in the presence of the court. (See vol. 131, U.S.  Reports, page 277, where the case is reported.)

Mr. Montgomery was feckless enough to contradict the record when he stated that Justice Field in his opinion in the revivor case “took occasion to discuss at considerable length the question of the genuineness of the aforesaid marriage document, maintaining very strenuously that it was a forgery, and that this it was that so aroused the indignation of Mrs. Terry that she sprang to her feet and charged Justice Field with having been bought.”

There is not a word of truth in this statement.  Justice Field, in overruling the demurrer, never discussed at all the genuineness of the marriage agreement.  How, then, could it be true that words, nowhere to be found in Judge Field’s opinion, “so aroused the indignation of Mrs. Terry that she sprang to her feet and charged Justice Field with having been bought”?  Justice Field discussed only the legal effect of the decree already rendered by the United States Circuit Court.  He said nothing to excite the woman’s ire, except to state the necessary steps to be taken to enforce the decree.  He had not participated in the trial of the original case, and had never been called upon to express any opinion concerning the agreement.  Mr. Montgomery said in his brief that the opinion read by Justice