of the circuit to another in which either is required to open a court and hear causes, and for the purpose of fully discharging his official duties, is while en route in the discharge of an official function, and constructively his court is open to the extent that an assault upon him, because of matters pending in his court, or because of judgments he has rendered or is to render, is an assault upon the court, and his bailiff or marshal detailed to attend the court or to aid in preserving the order and dignity of the court has the same right to protect him from assault then that he would have, had the judge actually reached his court-room.

But further than this, we hold that in view of the undeniable fact that the Justice had knowledge of the fact that the Terrys, man and wife, had sworn to punish him; that they had indulged in threats against him of the most pronounced character; that they had boarded a train on which it is probable they knew he had taken passage from one part of his circuit to another in his capacity as a magistrate; in view of the fact that Terry sought the first opportunity to approach and strike him, and that, too, when seated; and in view of the notorious fact that Terry always went armed—­the man who shot Terry would have been justified in doing so had he not even been commissioned as an officer of the court.  He warned the assailant to desist, and knowing his custom to go armed, and that he had threatened the Justice, and Terry refusing to restrain his blows, it was Neagle’s duty to save life, to strike down the assailant in the most effectual manner.  Men who, having the ability to prevent murder, stand by and see it committed, may well be held to accountability for criminal negligence.

But in this case it is clear that murder was intended on the part of the Terrys.  One of them ran for her pistol and brought it, and would have reached the other’s side with it in time, had she not been detained by strong men at the door.  Neagle saw this woman depart, and coupling it with the advance of Terry, knew, as a matter of course, what it meant.  He had been deputed by the chief law officer of the Government—­in view of previous assaults by the Terrys and their threats and display of weapons in court—­to stand guard over the judges and protect them.  He acted, therefore, precisely as it was proper he should do.  Had he been less prompt and vigorous, all the world knows that not he but Terry would to-day be in custody, and not Terry but the venerable justice of the Supreme Court of the United States would to-day be in the coffin.

These remarks have grown too extended for any elaboration of the moral of the tragedy that culminated in the killing of David S. Terry yesterday.  But we cannot allow the subject to be even temporarily dismissed without calling the thought of the reader to contemplation of the essential truth that society is bound to protect the judges of the courts of the land from violence