have been charged or even suspected of anything
wrong in the matter. The magistrate who issued
the warrant for your arrest may possibly have
thought it his duty to do so, without looking beyond
the “railing accusation” of a baffled
and infuriated murderess, which all the world
instinctively knew to be false, yet I suppose
there is not an intelligent man, woman, or child on
the continent who does not consider it an infamous
and unmitigated outrage, or who is not thoroughly
satisfied that the brave fellow who defended you
so opportunely was legally and morally justifiable
in what he did. I have not been in a condition
to think very coherently, much less to read
anything in relation to the question of jurisdiction
raised by the State authorities in the habeas
corpus issued in your behalf by the U.S.
Circuit Court, and it may be that, from the mere
newspaper’s reports that have reached me, I have
been unable to fully apprehend the objections
which are made to the courts hearing all the facts
on the trial of the writ; but it occurs to me
as a plain principle of common sense that the federal
government should not only have the power, but that
it is necessary to its own preservation, to protect
its officers from being wantonly or maliciously
interfered with, hindered or obstructed in the
lawful exercises of their official duties, not
arbitrarily of course, but through its regularly constituted
agencies, and according to the established principles
of law; and where such obstruction consists in the
forcible restraint of the officer’s liberty,
I see no reason why the federal judiciary should
not inquire into it on habeas corpus, when
it is alleged to be not only illegal but contrived
for the very purpose of hindering the officer in the
discharge of his official duties, and impairing
the efficiency of the public service. It
is true that in such an investigation a real or
apparent conflict between State and federal authority
may be presented, which a due regard to the respective
rights of the two governments would require to be
considered with the utmost caution, such caution,
at least, as it is fair to presume an intelligent
court would always be careful to exercise, in
view of the absolute importance of maintaining
as far as possible the strictest harmony between the
two jurisdictions. Yet those rights are determined
and by fixed legal principles, which it would
be impossible for a court to apply in any case
without a competent knowledge of the facts
upon which their application in the particular case
might depend. For instance, if your court should
issue a writ of habeas corpus for the relief
of a federal officer upon the averments in his
petition that he was forcibly and illegally restrained
of his liberty for the purpose of preventing him
from performing his official duties, and it should
appear in the return to the writ that the person detaining
the prisoner was a ministerial officer of the State
government authorized by its laws to execute its