than there is to protect him out of court, when on the way from one court to another in the discharge of his official duties.  The marshals are in daily attendance upon the judges, and performing official duties in their chambers.  Yet no statute specifically points out those duties or requires their performance.  Indeed, no such places as chambers for the circuit judges or circuit justices are mentioned at all in the statutes.  Yet the marshal is as clearly authorized to protect the judges there as in the court-room.  All business done out of court by the judge is called chamber business.  But it is not necessary to be done in what is usually called chambers.  Chamber business may be done, and often is done, on the street, in the judge’s own house, at the hotel where he stops, when absent from home, or it may be done in transitu, on the cars in going from one place to another within the proper jurisdiction to hold court.  Mr. Justice Field could, as well, and as authoritatively, issue a temporary injunction, grant a writ of habeas corpus, an order to show cause, or do any other chamber business for the district in the dining-room at Lathrop, as at his chambers in San Francisco, or in the court-room.  The chambers of the judge, where chambers are provided, are not an element of jurisdiction, but are a convenience to the judge, and to suitors—­places where the judge at proper times can be readily found, and the business conveniently transacted.

But inasmuch as the Revised Statutes of the United States (sec. 753) declare that the writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to “a prisoner in jail unless where he is in custody—­for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a court or judge thereof, or in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States,” it was urged in the argument by counsel for the State that there is no statute which specifically makes it the duty of a marshal or deputy marshal to protect the judges of the United States whilst out of the court-room, travelling from one point to another in their circuits, on official business, from the violence of litigants who have become offended at the adverse decisions made by them in the performance of their judicial duties, and that such officers are not within the provisions of that section.  To this the court replied that the language of the section is, “an act done in pursuance of a law of the United States”—­not in pursuance of a statute of the United States; and that the statutes do not present in express terms all the law of the United States; that their incidents and implications are as much a part of the law as their express provisions; and that when they prescribe duties providing for the accomplishment of certain designated objects, or confer authority in general terms, they carry with them all the powers essential to effect the ends designed.  As said by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v.