overshadowed by the larger island, which it so conspicuously confronts.  If, as has just been said, it by situation intercepts the access of Cuba to the Isthmus, it is itself cut off by its huge neighbor from secure communication with the North American Continent, now as always the chief natural source of supplies for the West Indies, which do not produce the great staples of life.  With the United States friendly or neutral, in a case of war, there can be no comparison between the advantages of Cuba, conferred by its situation and its size, and those of Jamaica, which, by these qualities of its rival, is effectually cut off from that source of supplies.  Nor is the disadvantage of Jamaica less marked with reference to communication with other quarters than the United States—­with Halifax, with Bermuda, with Europe.  Its distance from these points, and from Santa Lucia, where the resources of Europe may be said to focus for it, makes its situation one of extreme isolation; a condition emphasized by the fact that both Bermuda and Santa Lucia are themselves dependent upon outside sources for anything they may send to Jamaica.  At all these points, coal, the great factor of modern naval war, must be stored and the supply maintained.  They do not produce it.  The mere size of Cuba, the amount of population which it has, or ought to have, the number of its seaports, the extent of the industries possible to it, tend naturally to an accumulation of resources such as great mercantile communities always entail.  These, combined with its nearness to the United States, and its other advantages of situation, make Cuba a position that can have no military rival among the islands of the world, except Ireland.  With a friendly United States, isolation is impossible to Cuba.

The aim of any discussion such as this should be to narrow down, by a gradual elimination, the various factors to be considered, in order that the decisive ones, remaining, may become conspicuously visible.  The trees being thus thinned out, the features of the strategic landscape can appear.  The primary processes in the present case have been carried out before seeking the attention of the reader, to whom the first approximations have been presented under three heads.  First, the two decisive centres, the mouth of the Mississippi and the Isthmus.  Second, the four principal routes, connecting these two points with others, have been specified; these routes being, 1, between the Isthmus and the Mississippi themselves; 2, from the Isthmus to the North American coast, by the Windward Passage; 3, from the Gulf of Mexico to the North American coast, by the Strait of Florida; and, 4, from the Isthmus to Europe, by the Anegada Passage.  Third, the principal military positions throughout the region in question have been laid down, and their individual and relative importance indicated.