HIGH EXPLOSIVES IN WARFARE.[1]

[Footnote 1:  A lecture delivered before the Franklin Institute, Philadelphia, November 28, 1890.  From the Journal of the Institute.]

By Commander F.M.  Barber, U.S.N.

In commencing my paper this evening I desire to call your attention to the fact that I am dealing with a subject which, though not theoretical, is still hardly practical, for as a matter of fact high explosives cannot be said to have yet been regularly used in warfare, and I hope you will pardon me if in consequence my statements appear in some respects unsatisfactory and my theories unsound.  My subject, however, is no more obscure than future naval warfare generally.  All civilized nations are spending millions of money for fighting purposes directly in opposition to the higher feelings of the better class of their inhabitants.  The political atmosphere of Europe is the cause of this, but its consequence is the development of theoretical plans of ships which are no sooner commenced than the rapid march of mechanical, chemical, and electrical science shows them to be faulty in some particular feature, and others are laid down only to be superseded in their turn.

None of these crafts are obsolete (to use the popular expression of the day).  All are theoretically better than any which have stood the test of battle; but each excels its predecessor in some particular feature.  The use of high explosives is the direct cause of the very latest transformations in marine architecture, and is destined to work still greater changes; but it will require a war between the most civilized nations of the world, and a long war, to either confirm or condemn the many theoretical machines and methods of destruction that modern science has produced.  I say a war between the most civilized nations, since it is only they that can supply the educated intellect that is necessary to both attack and defense.  Under other circumstances false conclusions as to weapons and results are certain to be drawn.

At the bombardment of Alexandria, the English armorclads, with their rifled guns, were not nearly as efficient against the feeble chalk fortifications as our wooden ships would have been with smooth bore guns.  On the other hand I saw on shore after the bombardment hundreds of torpedoes and miles of cable that the Egyptians did not understand how to use.  The French war with China was equally unsatisfactory from a military point of view.  The Chinese at Foochow were annihilated because the French opened fire first, and the only shell that penetrated a French ironclad was filled with lamp black instead of powder.  The national riots that we are accustomed to hear of in South America are likewise of little instructive value; they buy their weapons of more civilized people, but there is always something fatally defective about the tactics pursued in using them.  It may be