be preserved as one empire, an authority sufficient to preserve that unity, and by its equal weight and pressure to consolidate the various parts that compose it, must reside somewhere:  that somewhere can only be in England.  Possibly any one member, distinctly taken, might decide in favor of that residence within itself; but certainly no member would give its voice for any other except this.  So that I look upon the residence of the supreme power to be settled here:  not by force, or tyranny, or even by mere long usage, but by the very nature of things, and the joint consent of the whole body.

If all this be admitted, then without question this country must have the sole right to the imperial legislation:  by which I mean that law which regulates the polity and economy of the several parts, as they relate to one another and to the whole.  But if any of the parts, which (not for oppression, but for order) are placed in a subordinate situation, will assume to themselves the power of hindering or checking the resort of their municipal subjects to the centre, or even to any other part of the empire, they arrogate to themselves the imperial rights, which do not, which cannot, belong to them, and, so far as in them lies, destroy the happy arrangement of the entire empire.

A free communication by discretionary residence is necessary to all the other purposes of communication.  For what purpose are the Irish and Plantation laws sent hither, but as means of preserving this sovereign constitution?  Whether such a constitution was originally right or wrong this is not the time of day to dispute.  If any evils arise from it, let us not strip it of what may be useful in it.  By taking the English Privy Council into your legislature, you obtain a new, a further, and possibly a more liberal consideration of all your acts.  If a local legislature shall by oblique means tend to deprive any of the people of this benefit, and shall make it penal to them to follow into England the laws which may affect them, then the English Privy Council will have to decide upon your acts without those lights that may enable them to judge upon what grounds you made them, or how far they ought to be modified, received, or rejected.

To what end is the ultimate appeal in judicature lodged in this kingdom, if men may be disabled from following their suits here, and may be taxed into an absolute denied of justice?  You observe, my dear Sir, that I do not assert that in all cases two shillings will necessarily cut off this means of correcting legislative and judicial mistakes, and thus amount to a denial of justice.  I might, indeed, state cases in which this very quantum of tax would be fully sufficient to defeat this right.  But I argue not on the case, but on the principle, and I am sure the principle implies it.  They who may restrain may prohibit; they who may impose two shillings may impose ten shillings in the pound; and those who may condition the tax to six months’ annual absence may carry that condition to six weeks, or even to six days, and thereby totally defeat the wise means which have been provided for extensive and impartial justice, and for orderly, well-poised, and well-connected government.