the objection, in such a case, ought not to arise from the natural infirmity of human institutions, but from substantial faults which contradict the nature and end of law itself,—­faults not arising from the imperfection, but from the misapplication and abuse of our reason.  As no legislators can regard the minima of equity, a law may in some instances be a just subject of censure without being at all an object of repeal.  But if its transgressions against common right and, the ends of just government should be considerable in their nature and spreading in their effects, as this objection goes to the root and principle of the law, it renders it void in its obligatory quality on the mind, and therefore determines it as the proper object of abrogation and repeal, so far as regards its civil existence.  The objection here is, as we observed, by no means on account of the imperfection of the law; it is on account of its erroneous principle:  for if this be fundamentally wrong, the more perfect the law is made, the worse it becomes.  It cannot be said to have the properties of genuine law, even in its imperfections and defects.  The true weakness and opprobrium of our best general constitutions is, that they cannot provide beneficially for every particular case, and thus fill, adequately to their intentions, the circle of universal justice.  But where the principle is faulty, the erroneous part of the law is the beneficial, and justice only finds refuge in those holes and corners which had escaped the sagacity and inquisition of the legislator.  The happiness or misery of multitudes can never be a thing indifferent.  A law against the majority of the people is in substance a law against the people itself; its extent determines its invalidity; it even changes its character as it enlarges its operation:  it is not particular injustice, but general oppression; and can no longer be considered as a private hardship, which might be borne, but spreads and grows up into the unfortunate importance of a national calamity.

Now as a law directed against the mass of the nation has not the nature of a reasonable institution, so neither has it the authority:  for in all forms of government the people is the true legislator; and whether the immediate and instrumental cause of the law be a single person or many, the remote and efficient cause is the consent of the people, either actual or implied; and such consent is absolutely essential to its validity.  To the solid establishment of every law two things are essentially requisite:  first, a proper and sufficient human power to declare and modify the matter of the law; and next, such a fit and equitable constitution as they have a right to declare and render binding.  With regard to the first requisite, the human authority, it is their judgment they give up, not their right.  The people, indeed, are presumed to consent to whatever the legislature ordains for their benefit; and they are to acquiesce in it, though they do not clearly see into the propriety