So far in a political light.

In an economical light, I must observe that the construction of such granaries throughout the kingdom would be at an expense beyond all calculation.  The keeping them up would be at a great charge.  The management and attendance would require an army of agents, store-keepers, clerks, and servants.  The capital to be employed in the purchase of grain would be enormous.  The waste, decay, and corruption would be a dreadful drawback on the whole dealing; and the dissatisfaction of the people, at having decayed, tainted, or corrupted corn sold to them, as must be the case, would be serious.

This climate (whatever others may be) is not favorable to granaries, where wheat is to be kept for any time.  The best, and indeed the only good granary, is the rick-yard of the farmer, where the corn is preserved in its own straw, sweet, clean, wholesome, free from vermin and from insects, and comparatively at a trifle of expense.  This, and the barn, enjoying many of the same advantages, have been the sole granaries of England from the foundation of its agriculture to this day.  All this is done at the expense of the undertaker, and at his sole risk.  He contributes to government, he receives nothing from it but protection, and to this he has a claim.

The moment that government appears at market, all the principles of market will be subverted.  I don’t know whether the farmer will suffer by it, as long as there is a tolerable market of competition; but I am sure, that, in the first place, the trading government will speedily become a bankrupt, and the consumer in the end will suffer.  If government makes all its purchases at once, it will instantly raise the market upon itself.  If it makes them by degrees, it must follow the course of the market.  If it follows the course of the market, it will produce no effect, and the consumer may as well buy as he wants; therefore all the expense is incurred gratis.

But if the object of this scheme should be, what I suspect it is, to destroy the dealer, commonly called the middle-man, and by incurring a voluntary loss to carry the baker to deal with government, I am to tell them that they must set up another trade, that of a miller or a meal-man, attended with a new train of expenses and risks.  If in both these trades they should succeed, so as to exclude those who trade on natural and private capitals, then they will have a monopoly in their hands, which, under the appearance of a monopoly of capital, will, in reality, be a monopoly of authority, and will ruin whatever it touches.  The agriculture of the kingdom cannot stand before it.