to his own territory. They might dispute about
the value of their several shares, but the contiguity
to each of the demandants always furnished the means
of an adjustment. Though hereafter the world
will have cause to rue this iniquitous measure, and
they most who were most concerned in it, for the moment
there was wherewithal in the object to preserve peace
amongst confederates in wrong. But the spoil
of France did not afford the same facilities for accommodation.
What might satisfy the House of Austria in a Flemish
frontier afforded no equivalent to tempt the cupidity
of the King of Prussia. What might be desired
by Great Britain in the West Indies must be coldly
and remotely, if at all, felt as an interest at Vienna,
and it would be felt as something worse than a negative
interest at Madrid. Austria, long possessed with
unwise and dangerous designs on Italy, could not be
very much in earnest about the conservation of the
old patrimony of the House of Savoy; and Sardinia,
who owed to an Italian force all her means of shutting
out France from Italy, of which she has been supposed
to hold the key, would not purchase the means of strength
upon one side by yielding it on the other: she
would not readily give the possession of Novara for
the hope of Savoy. No Continental power was willing
to lose any of its Continental objects for the increase
of the naval power of Great Britain; and Great Britain
would not give up any of the objects she sought for,
as the means of an increase to her naval power, to
further their aggrandizement.
The moment this war came to be considered as a war
merely of profit, the actual circumstances are such
that it never could become really a war of alliance.
Nor can the peace be a peace of alliance, until things
are put upon their right bottom.
I don’t find it denied, that, when a treaty
is entered into for peace, a demand will be made on
the Regicides to surrender a great part of their conquests
on the Continent. ’Will they, in the present
state of the war, make that surrender without an equivalent?
This Continental cession must of course be made in
favor of that party in the alliance that has suffered
losses. That party has nothing to furnish towards
an equivalent. What equivalent, for instance,
has Holland to offer, who has lost her all? What
equivalent can come from the Emperor, every part of
whose territories contiguous to France is already within
the pale of the Regicide dominion? What equivalent
has Sardinia to offer for Savoy, and for Nice,—I
may say, for her whole being? What has she taken
from the faction of France? She has lost very
near her all, and she has gained nothing. What
equivalent has Spain to give? Alas! she has already
paid for her own ransom the fund of equivalent,—and
a dreadful equivalent it is, to England and to herself.
But I put Spain out of the question: she is a
province of the Jacobin empire, and she must make peace
or war according to the orders she receives from the
Directory of Assassins. In effect and substance,
her crown is a fief of Regicide.