policy. Thus, on whatever roads he travelled,
they all terminated in recommending a recognition of
their pretended republic, and in the plan of sending
an ambassador to it. This was the burden of all
his song:—“Everything which we could
reasonably hope from war would be obtained from treaty.”
It is to be observed, however, that, in all these
debates, Mr. Fox never once stated to the House upon
what ground it was he conceived that all the objects
of the French system of united fanaticism and ambition
would instantly be given up, whenever England should
think fit to propose a treaty. On proposing so
strange a recognition and so humiliating an embassy
as he moved, he was bound to produce his authority,
if any authority he had. He ought to have done
this the rather, because Le Brun, in his first propositions,
and in his answers to Lord Grenville, defended,
on
principle, not on temporary convenience, everything
which was objected to France, and showed not the smallest
disposition to give up any one of the points in discussion.
Mr. Fox must also have known that the Convention had
passed to the order of the day, on a proposition to
give some sort of explanation or modification to the
hostile decree of the 19th of November for exciting
insurrections in all countries,—a decree
known to be peculiarly pointed at Great Britain.
The whole proceeding of the French administration
was the most remote that could be imagined from furnishing
any indication of a pacific disposition: for at
the very time in which it was pretended that the Jacobins
entertained those boasted pacific intentions, at the
very time in which Mr. Fox was urging a treaty with
them, not content with refusing a modification of the
decree for insurrections, they published their ever-memorable
decree of the 15th of December, 1792, for disorganizing
every country in Europe into which they should on
any occasion set their foot; and on the 25th and the
30th of the same month, they solemnly, and, on the
last of these days, practically, confirmed that decree.
23. But Mr. Fox had himself taken good care,
in the negotiation he proposed, that France should
not be obliged to make any very great concessions
to her presumed moderation: for he had laid down
one general, comprehensive rule, with him (as he said)
constant and inviolable. This rule, in fact,
would not only have left to the faction in France
all the property and power they had usurped at home,
but most, if not all, of the conquests which by their
atrocious perfidy and violence they had made abroad.
The principle laid down by Mr. Fox is this,—“That
every state, in the conclusion of a war, has a right
to avail itself of its conquests towards an indemnification.”
This principle (true or false) is totally contrary
to the policy which this country has pursued with
France at various periods, particularly at the Treaty
of Ryswick, in the last century, and at the Treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle, in this. Whatever the merits