But to return from this short digression,—­which, however, is not wholly foreign to the question of the effect of the will of the majority upon the form or the existence of their society.  I cannot too often recommend it to the serious consideration of all men who think civil society to be within the province of moral jurisdiction, that, if we owe to it any duty, it is not subject to our will.  Duties are not voluntary.  Duty and will are even contradictory terms.  Now, though civil society might be at first a voluntary act, (which in many cases it undoubtedly was,) its continuance is under a permanent standing covenant, coexisting with the society; and it attaches upon every individual of that society, without any formal act of his own.  This is warranted by the general practice, arising out of the general sense of mankind.  Men without their choice derive benefits from that association; without their choice they are subjected to duties in consequence of these benefits; and without their choice they enter into a virtual obligation as binding as any that is actual.  Look through the whole of life and the whole system of duties.  Much the strongest moral obligations are such as were never the results of our option.  I allow, that, if no Supreme Ruler exists, wise to form, and potent to enforce, the moral law, there is no sanction to any contract, virtual or even actual, against the will of prevalent power.  On that hypothesis, let any set of men be strong enough to set their duties at defiance, and they cease to be duties any longer.  We have but this one appeal against irresistible power,—­

    Si genus humanum et mortalia temnitis arma,
    At sperate Deos memores fandi atque nefandi.

Taking it for granted that I do not write to the disciples of the Parisian philosophy, I may assume that the awful Author of our being is the Author of our place in the order of existence,—­and that, having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, not according to our will, but according to His, He has in and by that disposition virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the place assigned us.  We have obligations to mankind at large, which are not in consequence of any special voluntary pact.  They arise from the relation of man to man, and the relation of man to God, which relations are not matters of choice.  On the contrary, the force of all the pacts which we enter into with any particular person or number of persons amongst mankind depends upon those prior obligations.  In some cases the subordinate relations are voluntary, in others they are necessary,—­but the duties are all compulsive.  When we marry, the choice is voluntary, but the duties are not matter of choice:  they are dictated by the nature of the situation.  Dark and inscrutable are the ways by which we come into the world.  The instincts which give rise to this mysterious process of Nature are not of our making.  But out of physical causes, unknown to us, perhaps unknowable, arise moral