system than of truth. Whereas, if a man with reasonable
good parts and natural sagacity, and not in the leading-strings
of any master, will look steadily on the business
before him, without being diverted by retrospect and
comparison, he may be capable of forming a reasonable
good judgment of what is to be done. There are
some fundamental points in which Nature never changes;
but they are few and obvious, and belong rather to
morals than to politics. But so far as regards
political matter, the human mind and human affairs
are susceptible of infinite modifications, and of
combinations wholly new and unlooked-for. Very
few, for instance, could have imagined that property,
which has been taken for natural dominion, should,
through the whole of a vast kingdom, lose all its
importance, and even its influence. This is what
history or books of speculation could hardly have
taught us. How many could have thought that the
most complete and formidable revolution in a great
empire should be made by men of letters, not as subordinate
instruments and trumpeters of sedition, but as the
chief contrivers and managers, and in a short time
as the open administrators and sovereign rulers?
Who could have imagined that atheism could produce
one of the most violently operative principles of
fanaticism? Who could have imagined, that, in
a commonwealth in a manner cradled in war, and in
an extensive and dreadful war, military commanders
should be of little or no account, —that
the Convention should not contain one military man
of name,—that administrative bodies, in
a state of the utmost confusion, and of but a momentary
duration, and composed of men with not one imposing
part of character, should be able to govern the country
and its armies with an authority which the most settled
senates and the most respected monarchs scarcely ever
had in the same degree? This, for one, I confess
I did not foresee, though all the rest was present
to me very early, and not out of my apprehension even
for several years.
I believe very few were able to enter into the effects
of mere terror, as a principle not only for
the support of power in given hands or forms, but
in those things in which the soundest political speculators
were of opinion that the least appearance of force
would be totally destructive,—such is the
market, whether of money, provision, or commodities
of any kind. Yet for four years we have seen loans
made, treasuries supplied, and armies levied and maintained,
more numerous than France ever showed in the field,
by the effects of fear alone.
Here is a state of things of which in its totality
if history furnishes any examples at all, they are
very remote and feeble. I therefore am not so
ready as some are to tax with folly or cowardice those
who were not prepared to meet an evil of this nature.
Even now, after the events, all the causes may be
somewhat difficult to ascertain. Very many are,
however, traceable. But these things history and
books of speculation (as I have already said) did
not teach men to foresee, and of course to resist.
Now that they are no longer a matter of sagacity, but
of experience, of recent experience, of our own experience,
it would be unjustifiable to go back to the records
of other times to instruct us to manage what they
never enabled us to foresee.