My clear opinion is, that Toulon ought to be made, what we set out with, a royal French city.  By the necessity of the case, it must be under the influence, civil and military, of the allies.  But the only way of keeping that jealous and discordant mass from tearing its component parts to pieces, and hazarding the loss of the whole, is, to put the place into the nominal government of the regent, his officers being approved by us.  This, I say, is absolutely necessary for a poise amongst ourselves.  Otherwise is it to be believed that the Spaniards, who hold that place with us in a sort of partnership, contrary to our mutual interest, will see us absolute masters of the Mediterranean, with Gibraltar on one side and Toulon on the other, with a quiet and composed mind, whilst we do little less than declare that we are to take the whole West Indies into our hands, leaving the vast, unwieldy, and feeble body of the Spanish dominions in that part of the world absolutely at our mercy, without any power to balance us in the smallest degree?  Nothing is so fatal to a nation as an extreme of self-partiality, and the total want of consideration of what others will naturally hope or fear.  Spain must think she sees that we are taking advantage of the confusions which reign in France to disable that country, and of course every country, from affording her protection, and in the end to turn the Spanish monarchy into a province.  If she saw things in a proper point of light, to be sure, she would not consider any other plan of politics as of the least moment in comparison of the extinction of Jacobinism.  But her ministers (to say the best of them) are vulgar politicians.  It is no wonder that they should postpone this great point, or balance it by considerations of the common politics, that is, the questions of power between state and state.  If we manifestly endeavor to destroy the balance, especially the maritime and commercial balance, both in Europe and the West Indies, (the latter their sore and vulnerable part,) from fear of what France may do for Spain hereafter, is it to be wondered that Spain, infinitely weaker than we are, (weaker, indeed, than such a mass of empire ever was,) should feel the same fears from our uncontrolled power that we give way to ourselves from a supposed resurrection of the ancient power of France under a monarchy?  It signifies nothing whether we are wrong or right in the abstract; but in respect to our relation to Spain, with such principles followed up in practice, it is absolutely impossible that any cordial alliance can subsist between the two nations.  If Spain goes, Naples will speedily follow.  Prussia is quite certain, and thinks of nothing but making a market of the present confusions.  Italy is broken and divided.  Switzerland is Jacobinized, I am afraid, completely.  I have long seen with pain the progress of French principles in that country.  Things cannot go on upon the present bottom.  The possession of Toulon, which, well managed, might