Believe a man who has seen much and observed something.  I have seen, in the course of my life, a great many of that family of men.  They are generally chosen because they have no opinion of their own; and as far as they can be got in good earnest to embrace any opinion, it is that of whoever happens to employ them, (neither longer nor shorter, narrower nor broader,) with whom they have no discussion or consultation.  The only thing which occurs to such a man, when he has got a business for others into his hands, is, how to make his own fortune out of it.  The person he is to treat with is not, with him, an adversary over whom he is to prevail, but a new friend he is to gain; therefore he always systematically betrays some part of his trust.  Instead of thinking how he shall defend his ground to the last, and, if forced to retreat, how little he shall give up, this kind of man considers how much of the interest of his employer he is to sacrifice to his adversary.  Having nothing but himself in view, he knows, that, in serving his principal with zeal, he must probably incur some resentment from the opposite party.  His object is, to obtain the good-will of the person with whom he contends, that, when an agreement is made, he may join in rewarding him.  I would not take one of these as my arbitrator in a dispute for so much as a fish-pond; for, if he reserved the mud to me, he would be sure to give the water that fed the pool to my adversary.  In a great cause, I should certainly wish that my agent should possess conciliating qualities:  that he should be of a frank, open, and candid disposition, soft in his nature, and of a temper to soften animosities and to win confidence.  He ought not to be a man odious to the person he treats with, by personal injury, by violence, or by deceit, or, above all, by the dereliction of his cause in any former transactions.  But I would be sure that my negotiator should be mine,—­that he should be as earnest in the cause as myself, and known to be so,—­that he should not be looked upon as a stipendiary advocate, but as a principled partisan.  In all treaty it is a great point that all idea of gaining your agent is hopeless.  I would not trust the cause of royalty with a man who, professing neutrality, is half a republican.  The enemy has already a great part of his suit without a struggle,—­and he contends with advantage for all the rest.  The common principle allowed between your adversary and your agent gives your adversary the advantage in every discussion.

Before I shut up this discourse about neutral agency, (which I conceive is not to be found, or, if found, ought not to be used,) I have a few other remarks to make on the cause which I conceive gives rise to it.