The moderation and prudence of the present Elector, in my opinion, rather, perhaps, respites the troubles than secures the peace of the Electorate.  The offer of the succession to the crown of Poland is truly critical, whether he accepts or whether he declines it.  If the States will consent to his acceptance, it will add to the difficulties, already great, of his situation between the king of Prussia and the Emperor.—­But these thoughts lead me too far, when I mean to speak only of the interior condition of these princes.  It has always, however, some necessary connection with their foreign politics.

[Sidenote:  Holland.]

With regard to Holland, and the ruling party there, I do not think it at all tainted, or likely to be so, except by fear,—­or that it is likely to be misled, unless indirectly and circuitously.  But the predominant party in Holland is not Holland.  The suppressed faction, though suppressed, exists.  Under the ashes, the embers of the late commotions are still warm.  The anti-Orange party has from the day of its origin been French, though alienated in some degree for some time, through the pride and folly of Louis the Fourteenth.  It will ever hanker after a French connection; and now that the internal government in France has been assimilated in so considerable a degree to that which the immoderate republicans began so very lately to introduce into Holland, their connection, as still more natural, will be more desired.  I do not well understand the present exterior politics of the Stadtholder, nor the treaty into which the newspapers say he has entered for the States with the Emperor.  But the Emperor’s own politics with regard to the Netherlands seem to me to be exactly calculated to answer the purpose of the French Revolutionists.  He endeavors to crush the aristocratic party, and to nourish one in avowed connection with the most furious democratists in France.

These Provinces in which the French game is so well played they consider as part of the old French Empire:  certainly they were amongst the oldest parts of it.  These they think very well situated, as their party is well disposed to a reunion.  As to the greater nations, they do not aim at making a direct conquest of them, but, by disturbing them through a propagation of their principles, they hope to weaken, as they will weaken them, and to keep them in perpetual alarm and agitation, and thus render all their efforts against them utterly impracticable, whilst they extend the dominion of their sovereign anarchy on all sides.

[Sidenote:  England.]

As to England, there may be some apprehension from vicinity, from constant communication, and from the very name of liberty, which, as it ought to be very dear to us, in its worst abuses carries something seductive.  It is the abuse of the first and best of the objects which we cherish.  I know that many, who sufficiently dislike the system of France, have yet no apprehensions of its prevalence here.  I say nothing to the ground of this security in the attachment of the people to their Constitution, and their satisfaction in the discreet portion of liberty which it measures out to them.  Upon this I have said all I have to say, in the Appeal I have published.  That security is something, and not inconsiderable; but if a storm arises, I should not much rely upon it.