the world has ever been known to exclude so great a body of men (not born slaves) from the civil state, and all the benefits of its Constitution,—­the whole question comes before Parliament as a matter for its prudence.  I do not put the thing on a question of right.  That discretion, which in judicature is well said by Lord Coke to be a crooked cord, in legislature is a golden rule.  Supplicants ought not to appear too much in the character of litigants.  If the subject thinks so highly and reverently of the sovereign authority as not to claim anything of right, so that it may seem to be independent of the power and free choice of its government,—­and if the sovereign, on his part, considers the advantages of the subjects as their right, and all their reasonable wishes as so many claims,—­in the fortunate conjunction of these mutual dispositions are laid the foundations of a happy and prosperous commonwealth.  For my own part, desiring of all things that the authority of the legislature under which I was born, and which I cherish, not only with a dutiful awe, but with a partial and cordial affection, to be maintained in the utmost possible respect, I never will suffer myself to suppose that at bottom their discretion will be found to be at variance with their justice.

The whole being at discretion, I beg leave just to suggest some matters for your consideration:—­Whether the government in Church or State is likely to be more secure by continuing causes of grounded discontent to a very great number (say two millions) of the subjects? or whether the Constitution, combined and balanced as it is, will be rendered more solid by depriving so large a part of the people of all concern or interest or share in its representation, actual or virtual?  I here mean to lay an emphasis on the word virtual.  Virtual representation is that in which there is a communion of interests and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in the name of any description of people and the people in whose name they act, though the trustees are not actually chosen by them.  This is virtual representation.  Such a representation I think to be in many cases even better than the actual.  It possesses most of its advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences; it corrects the irregularities in the literal representation, when the shifting current of human affairs or the acting of public interests in different ways carry it obliquely from its first line of direction.  The people may err in their choice; but common interest and common sentiment are rarely mistaken.  But this sort of virtual representation cannot have a long or sure existence, if it has not a substratum in the actual.  The member must have some relation to the constituent.  As things stand, the Catholic, as a Catholic, and belonging to a description, has no virtual relation to the representative,—­but the contrary.  There is a relation in mutual obligation.  Gratitude may not always have a very