There is in all parties, between the principal leaders in Parliament and the lowest followers out of doors, a middle sort of men, a sort of equestrian order, who, by the spirit of that middle situation, are the fittest for preventing things from running to excess.  But indecision, though a vice of a totally different character, is the natural accomplice of violence.  The irresolution and timidity of those who compose this middle order often prevents the effect of their controlling situation.  The fear of differing with the authority of leaders on the one hand, and of contradicting the desires of the multitude on the other, induces them to give a careless and passive assent to measures in which they never were consulted; and thus things proceed, by a sort of activity of inertness, until whole bodies, leaders, middle-men, and followers, are all hurried, with every appearance and with many of the effects of unanimity, into schemes of politics, in the substance of which no two of them were ever fully agreed, and the origin and authors of which, in this circular mode of communication, none of them find it possible to trace.  In my experience, I have seen much of this in affairs which, though trifling in comparison to the present, were yet of some importance to parties; and I have known them suffer by it.  The sober part give their sanction, at first through inattention and levity; at last they give it through necessity.  A violent spirit is raised, which the presiding minds after a time find it impracticable to stop at their pleasure, to control, to regulate, or even to direct.

This shows, in my opinion, how very quick and awakened all men ought to be, who are looked up to by the public, and who deserve that confidence, to prevent a surprise on their opinions, when dogmas are spread and projects pursued by which the foundations of society may be affected.  Before they listen even to moderate alterations in the government of their country, they ought to take care that principles are not propagated for that purpose which are too big for their object.  Doctrines limited in their present application, and wide in their general principles, are never meant to be confined to what they at first pretend.  If I were to form a prognostic of the effect of the present machinations on the people from their sense of any grievance they suffer under this Constitution, my mind would be at ease.  But there is a wide difference between the multitude, when they act against their government from a sense of grievance or from zeal for some opinions.  When men are thoroughly possessed with that zeal, it is difficult to calculate its force.  It is certain that its power is by no means in exact proportion to its reasonableness.  It must always have been discoverable by persons of reflection, but it is now obvious to the world, that a theory concerning government may become as much a cause of fanaticism as a dogma in religion.  There is a boundary to men’s passions, when they act