Early on January 20 Clery with one brigade and artillery advanced up the re-entrant which springs from the river towards the east end of the Rangeworthy Heights, and posted his guns half way up the valley on Three Tree Hill.  Hart, with a brigade of five battalions, was sent to occupy the irregular southern crest of the heights running from Three Tree Hill towards Bastion Hill.  He drove the Boers out of their advanced trenches, but found that the northern and higher crest to which they had retired, could only be won by a frontal advance across open ground.  He and his brave Irishmen were as ready as ever to push on in the line of the greatest resistance, but he was ordered by Clery to forbear.  Meanwhile Dundonald, not deterred by the damping of his trek on the 18th, and while obeying an order from Warren to come to heel, seized Bastion Hill, thereby securing Hart’s left flank on the crest.  So far as they went, the operations of January 20 were successful.  Warren’s pivot movement was in train, the whole of his force was now threatening the Boer right which was widely extended but deficient in depth; and the day’s casualties were few.  Following the example of Buller, who delegated his authority to Warren, the latter entrusted the conduct of the day’s operations to Clery, who in succession ordered the chief movement to be carried out by Hart.  Next day the mounted troops on Bastion Hill were relieved by infantry.

Buller was aware that the Ladysmith garrison, weakened by sickness and privation, could give him little or no help; but at least during the earlier phase of the Trickhardt’s Drift operations he was confident.  On January 17 he told White that “somehow he thought he was going to be successful this time,” and that he hoped to be within touch of Ladysmith in six days.  His Head Quarters were at Spearman’s Camp, a few miles south of Mount Alice, whence he rode over daily to note and criticize the tactics.

It now occurred to Warren that he might have been mistaken as to the significance of the position occupied by the enemy on the Rangeworthy Heights, and that it might be in reality a screen to hide a trek of the Free Staters back to their own country; and on this supposition, which was founded upon reports that the Siege of Ladysmith had been raised and that some wagons had been seen on trek westwards towards the Drakensberg passes, he applied for reinforcements to enable him to block the way.

Buller sent him Talbot Coke’s brigade with some howitzers; and came over to consult with him on January 22.  The situation was not satisfactory.  Time was being wasted, Warren’s “special arrangements” had done little, and now he had a new idea.  Buller still advocated an attack on the enemy’s right, while Warren wished to persevere with his advance by the Fairview Road; but he pointed out that Spion Kop, which his reading of the “secret instructions” had led him to regard as out of bounds, must first be taken.  No definite action seems to have been decided on, and Warren was left to act within certain limits on his own responsibility.  Finally, with the approval of the four infantry generals, he resolved to seize Spion Kop that night.  The attack, however, was postponed until the following night, to give time for the position to be reconnoitred.