In dense formation, although the enemy was reported to be in force on his front, Hart crossed the Doornkop Spruit without recognizing it and advanced to the West Drift guided by a Kaffir who lived close by.  The native seems either to have had misgivings as to the fordability of the Drift or to have been carelessly instructed, for as the column approached the river he pointed to a Drift which was not the East Drift, but the Drift at the head of the loop near his own kraal; and Hart was induced to change direction and lead the Brigade into the loop.

At 6 a.m. against the orders of Botha, who wished to lure on his foe, the Boer guns commanding Hart’s loop suddenly opened on the dense battalions, and the trenches on the left bank took up the firing.  The Kaffir guide disappeared in terror.  But Hart still believed that there was a drift to be found somewhere or other and pushed his Brigade, like a shoal of herrings driven into a purse net, up the loop; and some companies even reached the kraal near the head of it.  Without artillery—­for Hart had not brought up the field batteries assigned to him—­and exposed to a concentrated fire from front, left, and right, the unhappy Irish Brigade, which suffered 400 casualties in less than three quarters of an hour, was helpless.  Hart began to deploy, but Buller who from Naval Gun Hill was watching, possibly with astonishment, the entanglement in the loop ordered him to withdraw, at the same time sending two battalions to dig him out of his hole.  It was not an easy task and it was made more difficult by the gallant reluctance of the Irishmen to retreat before the enemy.  Thus Hart and Long, the former with his Hibernian zeal to move in the line of the greatest resistance, the latter with his rash generalization that entrenched Boers could be coerced as if they were Omdurman dervishes in the open, brought about the reverse at Colenso.

By this time it was evident to Buller that his scheme must fail.  He had already arranged the extrication of Hart and now the extrication of Long called for immediate action.  He therefore rode across to the deep donga east of the railway; on his way informing Hildyard, whose brigade was awaiting an opportunity to carry out its orders, that the attack was abandoned and that the brigade must cover the withdrawal of the field batteries.  He ordered the naval battery to retire, and sent back the ammunition wagons, which after long delay were on their way to the field guns:  and acknowledged that he was baffled.

Hildyard occupied Colenso but was unable to prevent the Boers re-opening fire from Fort Wyllie on the desolate batteries lying on the veld.  No troops could move across the open; and only individual efforts could now save the guns.  Not a few officers and men offered for the forlorn hope, and at the first attempt two guns were rescued.  A later attempt was not successful, and at 11 a.m.  Buller ordered a general retirement and the abandonment of the guns.