Buller, soon after his arrival in Natal, found himself in command of a force of 19,000 men with whom to tackle about 21,000 Boers under the command of L. Botha.  Joubert was invalided after the unsuccessful Estcourt raid, and the change was, from the enemy’s point of view, for the better.  The new Head Commandant was a more strenuous and active leader than his predecessor.

Little was known of the topography of the country in which Buller was about to operate.  It had never been systematically surveyed, and the existing maps had been constructed for agricultural rather than for campaigning purposes, and could not be trusted.  The Tugela formed the ditch of a natural fortress covering Ladysmith.  On its left bank rose an almost continuous ridge or rampart from which the easy open ground on the right bank could be watched for miles, and reconnaissances kept at a distance.

Reconnaissances were, however, not needed to prove to Buller that Colenso, where the railway passed up into the Tugela ridge, was immune to a frontal attack, and that Ladysmith must be relieved by a turning movement.  Two alternatives offered themselves.  The advance might be made through Weenen and across the Tugela some distance below Colenso, and thence to Elandslaagte, where the Boer line of communication with the Transvaal might be cut; but to Ladysmith this was a circuitous route.  It also would necessitate the traversing of a rough bush country, into which Buller was reluctant to throw raw troops just off the transports who had not yet heard the sounds of war.

He therefore decided upon a westerly flank march by way of Potgieter’s Drift, twenty miles west of Colenso; and once on the left bank of the Tugela he would be within a day’s march of Ladysmith and the railway into the Free State.  White was heliographically consulted, and all the arrangements for an advance on December 11 were made.  The force had even been set in motion when certain disturbing news came out of the west.  Gatacre had suffered a reverse at Stormberg, and simultaneously Methuen had been roughly handled at Magersfontein, and was unable to continue his march on Kimberley.

The strategic timidity of Buller and his curious habit of allowing himself to be influenced by psychological probabilities were at once apparent.  The anticipated moral effect of these successes upon the enemy swayed him back to the plan which a day or two previously he had rejected as impracticable.  The plan of a flank march by way of Potgieter’s Drift was thrown aside.  It might have been justifiable in the presence of a dispirited enemy; but now the burghers on the Tugela had been suddenly encouraged by news of victories won on two widely separated scenes of action and were no doubt anxious to rival the exploits of their comrades far away.[20] The flank march would expose the army to the danger of being cut off by a quickened and revived foe, and Buller determined not to run the risk.  On December 12 he ordered an advance on Colenso.