* * * * *

Such, in brief, was the position in the Transvaal when Lord Kitchener, after a flying visit to Bloemfontein for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities against De Wet, returned to Pretoria on December 11, 1900.  It would have offered greater difficulties to a man who was a soldier first and an organizer afterwards than it did to the successor of Lord Roberts.  It may be likened to an archipelago in a stormy sea infested by pirates who, though powerless to take possession of any of the islands, made communication between them always dangerous and sometimes impossible.

[Sidenote:  Map, p. 240.]

Lord Kitchener’s coming difficulties were heralded less than a week after the departure of Lord Roberts by the loss of a large convoy which was proceeding to Rustenburg, and for which Delarey, who was always to be found where weak detachments came his way, was waiting.  Ten days later Clements suffered a disaster.  He was based on Krugersdorp, but his command had been weakened and his transport was deficient.  He received orders to act in the Hekpoort Valley, while Broadwood acted north of the Magaliesberg.  When he reached Noitgedacht Nek he found Delarey a few miles away.  At his urgent request a small portion of the troops which had been taken from him was restored, with a few wagons; but they left Krugersdorp too late to be of service.

Clements was under the impression that he had only Delarey to deal with, and was unaware that Beyers was on his way to carry out the orders he had received from Botha.  The withdrawal of Paget to Eerstefabriken cleared his front, and he marched on to the Magaliesberg.  His movements were not unnoticed by the Intelligence, which, however, failed to notify them to Clements, who on December 11 was in presence of two Boer leaders, whose united forces were twice as strong as his own.  Unknown to him they had met at Boschfontein near the southern approach to Breedt’s Nek; for when a commando was reported to be at hand, he did not doubt that it was Delarey’s force only.

Noitgedacht was tactically an unsound position which Clements, assuming that his right was safe, had taken up in order to maintain heliographic communication with Broadwood on the other side of the Magaliesberg.  The range rises more than a thousand feet above the camp selected by Clements and is accessible only by a rough track.  The ground on either side of the Nek was occupied by pickets posted there mainly for signalling purposes.  These posts, however, were helpless if attacked, as they were not only widely scattered, but could not be reinforced from the main body in the valley below.  Thus they were little or no protection to the camp.

In the direction from which an attack might be expected Clements’ camp, which lay at the foot of the Nek, was protected by a low ridge jutting out from the main range and ending in a detached kopje.  This ridge was held by mounted infantry.  Another detached kopje, called Yeomanry Hill, was occupied towards the S.E.