commandos in the field.  French’s “drive,” from a military point of view, was not a success; but it at least frightened Botha and the Transvaal Government.  In May, 1901, there was a conference near Ermelo at which it was resolved that overtures should be made to Lord Kitchener; and but for Steyn, who was communicated with in the Orange River Colony, and who had had no experience of the “drive,” it is probable that negotiations for peace would have ensued.  On the other hand, the “drive” has been approved as a method of warfare particularly adapted for use by an army deficient in mobility and incapable of acquiring accurate intelligence of the enemy.

* * * * *

During the two months preceding Lord Roberts’ departure from South Africa at the end of November, 1900, no events of great military importance occurred in the Transvaal, except De Wet’s Fredrikstad raid.  The opposition had, to all appearance, dissolved into impalpable matter.  Here and there some Boer atoms coalesced and were not pulverized; but for many weeks there was little in the general situation to disturb the optimistic belief, which was held not only by the people at home but also by the Army in the field, that the end was not far off.

Botha and Steyn reached Pietersburg in September, where they were joined by B. Viljoen, who arrived a few weeks later after a circuitous journey from Komati Poort through the low veld.  An important detail of Lord Roberts’ plan of campaign had not been carried out.  He had hoped that the Northern Transvaal would be denied to the Boers by Carrington, who failed to carry out his part of the programme.  Thus Pietersburg was a fairly secure eyrie in which plans could be devised and from which a swoop could be made either east or west of Pretoria.

Botha and Steyn soon came to the conclusion that the situation, though serious, was by no means hopeless.  Certain events of October and November were encouraging.  They not unnaturally argued that the withdrawal of their two chief opponents, Lord Roberts and Sir Redvers Buller, indicated infirmity of purpose on the part of the British Government.  The idea was mistaken, as the recall of these leaders, or at least of one of them, was due to the fact that the British Government was of opinion that the war was practically over.  Again, they were relieved of the inconvenient and harassing presence of Kruger, the dour, reactionary old farmer, who had brought on the war and had now left his country to its fate; who had learnt nothing and forgotten nothing since he had set out on the Great Trek of 1836; and whose mind ran in a channel so shallow that it could almost be heard rippling over the stones.  Also, it is probable that they had information that the majority of the men of the Colonial and Irregular Corps, whose term of service of one year would shortly expire, or had already expired, were declining to re-enlist—­yet another sign of infirmity of purpose.  Moreover, the Boer agents in Europe no doubt reported that all the regular infantry and its reserves in Great Britain had been exhausted.